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One Nation, Under . . . The Watchmaker?: Intelligent Design and 
the Establishment Clause 
 
Nicholas A. Schuneman*
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
For nearly eighty years, American courts have mediated the debate 
between creationists and evolutionists. As one scholar has shown, 
American creationists’ legislative campaign against the Theory of 
Evolution can be broken down into three eras: (1) the era of anti-
evolution legislation, (2) the era of balanced treatment statutes, and (3) 
the era of minimization.1 The first era, characterized by outright bans of 
evolutionary theory in public school curricula, reached its climax in the 
famous “Scopes Monkey Trial”2 and ended with the Supreme Court’s 
declaration in Epperson v. Arkansas that anti-evolution statutes violate 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.3 After Epperson 
halted creationist attempts to exclude the Theory of Evolution from 
public school curricula, creationists adopted a new strategy, supporting 
legislation that requires “equal treatment” for evolution and creationism 
in science courses. This tactic was quashed by the Supreme Court in 
Edwards v. Aguillard on the rationale that such legislation served no 
secular purpose; thus ended the era of balanced-treatment statutes.4 The 
third era, which continues to the current day, involves primarily subtle 
attacks designed to minimize the role of the Theory of Evolution in 
public education as well as to diminish its credibility in the eyes of 
students. These attacks have taken the form of attempts to eliminate 
evolutionary theory from state standardized tests, the use of disclaimers 
which marginalize the Theory of Evolution and suggest creationism as a 
viable alternative, and the presentation of scientific and philosophical 
“evidence” against evolution to either imply or directly support the 
* The author would like to thank Richard Fallon for his invaluable support and advice throughout the 
research and writing process. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. 
 1. Lisa D. Kirkpatrick, Note, Forgetting the Lessons of History: The Evolution of 
Creationism and Current Trends to Restrict the Teaching of Evolution in Public Schools, 49 DRAKE 
L. REV. 125, 130–40 (2000). 
 2. Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927). 
 3. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 4. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1, at 135; see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
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hypothesis of creation by a supernatural agent.5
Without a doubt, the most intriguing and controversial weapon in the 
creationist’s third-era arsenal is the Intelligent Design hypothesis. A 
subtle variant of its philosophical predecessor, so-called “creation 
science,” the Intelligent Design hypothesis has captured the imagination 
of Christian fundamentalists and inspired anger and angst among 
Darwinian loyalists. In contrast to its precursors, however, the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis has been championed by highly-qualified academics 
that support the hypothesis with sophisticated arguments. Many of the 
hypothesis’ proponents have participated in public debates with 
evolutionists, and major universities have sponsored scholarly symposia 
on the topic of Intelligent Design. Several public school boards, backed 
by faith-based think tanks, have considered including the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis within their science curricula,6 and legal scholars have 
published defenses of the Intelligent Design hypothesis against claims 
that such curricula would violate the Establishment Clause.7 Prominent 
national politicians, such as President George W. Bush and Senator Bill 
Frist, have chimed in on the topic, proclaiming their support for 
Intelligent Design in public schools.8
Following the trail first blazed by its metaphysical precursors, 
Creationism and Creation Science, Intelligent Design soon found its way 
into a federal courthouse. In the case of Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School 
District,9 the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania became the first federal court to address the 
constitutionality of public school instruction on the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis. The court, in an exceptionally meticulous opinion by Judge 
John E. Jones, applied both the endorsement and Lemon tests in reaching 
 5. Kirkpatrick, supra note 1, at 135. 
 6. The Kansas State Board of Education heard testimony from several Intelligent Design 
advocates in the procedures leading up to its revised 2005 science standards. While the Board did 
not incorporate the Intelligent Design hypothesis into the required curriculum, it was careful to note 
that the Science Education Standards “neither mandate nor prohibit teaching” the hypothesis. See 
Kansas Science Education Standards, Draft 2(d). The Dover, Pennsylvania school board went so far 
as to adopt a resolution requiring that students “be made aware of gaps/problems in Darwin’s theory 
and of other theories of evolution including, but not limited to, intelligent design.” The resolution 
and its application were recently held to violate the Establishment Clause. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area 
Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 7. See, e.g., Francis Beckwith, Science and Religion Twenty Years After McLean v. 
Arkansas: Evolution, Public Education, and the New Challenge of Intelligent Design, 26 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 455 (2003); see also Stephen L. Marshall, Note, When May a State Require Teaching 
Alternatives to the Theory of Evolution? Intelligent Design as a Test Case, 90 KY. L.J. 743 (2002). 
 8. See Daniel C. Dennett, Op-Ed., Show Me the Science, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2005, § 4, at 
11. 
 9. Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707. 
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its decision.10 The court held that the Dover Area School District’s policy 
requiring instructors to introduce students to the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis would be perceived as state endorsement of religion, that the 
policy was motivated by a religious purpose, and that the policy had as 
its only effect the advancement of religion.11 The holding rested on three 
independent observations about the Intelligent Design hypothesis: (1) its 
intellectual roots in the creationist movement and its almost exclusive 
support by fundamentalist Christians, (2) its fundamentally religious 
nature12 and (3) its failure to satisfy the generally-accepted requirements 
of a scientific theory.13 Judge Jones’ reliance on multiple independent 
grounds leaves no legal or logical room in which Intelligent Design 
advocates might maneuver. However, the Kitzmiller opinion’s robustness 
serves to obscure the issue of what kinds of ideas may be taught in public 
schools. Although the Kitzmiller court was willing to find Intelligent 
Design—with its open and obvious ties to identifiable and unarguably 
religious organizations—unconstitutional, it is not entirely obvious that a 
court would be so quick to identify ideas similar to the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis, but lacking its ties to recognizable religious groups, as 
religious notions. As long as judges can point to sectarian advocates for 
ideas that dwell in the murky margins between religion and science, they 
need not take a bold stand on the nature of ideas themselves. It is simply 
not that controversial to categorize a claim as religious if its proponents 
are culled exclusively from religious advocacy groups. But what 
becomes of similar metaphysical claims without ties to recognizable, 
traditional faiths? 
This paper examines the constitutionality of teaching the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis in public schools, but with a more directed focus than 
Judge Jones’ opinion in Kitzmiller. Instead of dwelling on the religious 
pedigree of the Intelligent Design hypothesis, as have other analyses of 
the issue,14 the paper focuses on the constitutional consequences of the 
hypothesis’ substantive claims. In other words, the intent is to evaluate 
the constitutionality of Intelligent Design on the basis of the claims it 
makes, and not on the motivations of those who make them. It is hoped 
 10. Id. at 712. 
 11. Id. at 765–66. The particular policy at issue mandated that teachers read ninth-grade 
biology students a statement that challenged the validity of the Theory of Evolution and introduced 
and encouraged students to explore the concept of Intelligent Design. In addition, the policy required 
that the book Of Pandas and People be made available for students’ reference. See id. at 708–09. 
 12. Id. at 716–23. 
 13. Id. at 716–23, 735–46. 
 14. See, e.g., Jay Wexler, Note, Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The 
Constitutionality of Teaching Intelligent Design in the Public Schools, 49 STAN. L. REV. 439, 463–
66 (1997). 
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that, in doing so, we might clarify the boundary separating those ideas 
that may be taught in public schools without offending the Establishment 
clause from those that may not and reduce the courts’ reliance on tracing 
an idea’s intellectual pedigree to determine its constitutional status. In 
this sense, the Intelligent Design hypothesis serves as an example of a 
broad class of marginally religious notions that may find their way into 
public school curricula, and the analysis herein serves as a template for 
evaluating the Establishment Clause consequences of presenting these 
ideas to schoolchildren. Section II presents a primer on the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis, exploring the contours of the hypothesis by 
comparison to its metaphysical rival, the Theory of Evolution. Section III 
provides an overview of the Establishment Clause framework within 
which the constitutionality of the Intelligent Design hypothesis will be 
evaluated. In Section IV, public school instruction on the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis is explored under this framework. It is shown that 
while religious notions such as the Intelligent Design hypothesis may not 
be presented in the context of science courses without offending the First 
Amendment, there may be room for such ideas in other educational 
contexts. Section V addresses the complementary notion that instruction 
on the Theory of Evolution violates the Establishment Clause, and 
Section VI provides concluding remarks and observations. 
Before moving on, it is important to note three key limitations of the 
analysis presented in this paper. First, the analysis that follows is limited 
to public elementary and secondary schools. Second, claims made about 
the nature of the Intelligent Design hypothesis extend only to the 
hypothesis itself, and not necessarily to the evidence or arguments 
offered in support of the hypothesis. Finally, the following analysis 
proceeds without regard for the intellectual pedigree of the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis or the religious affiliations of its proponents. This 
final limitation allows us to focus on the constitutional consequences of 
the hypothesis’ substantive claims and, therefore, to generate a dialogue 
applicable to a wider range of potential ideas. With these caveats in 
mind, the constitutionality of public school instruction on the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis is discussed below. 
 
II.  PRIMER ON INTELLIGENT DESIGN 
 
The Intelligent Design hypothesis is primarily a response to and 
critique of the theory of evolution by natural selection (hereinafter, “the 
Theory of Evolution”), which was first elaborated by Charles Darwin in 
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his classic work, The Origin of Species.15 Thus, to understand the 
Intelligent Design hypothesis, one must first comprehend the basic 
structure of its analytical foil: the Theory of Evolution. 
 
A.  The Theory of Evolution 
 
The Theory of Evolution is a generic term for the scientific notion 
that modern earthly species emerged as the result of a long, slow process 
of gradual variation from an ancient common ancestor.16 According to 
the modern Theory of Evolution, commonly known as “neo-Darwinism,” 
the variation of species’ phenotypes (i.e., physical form) reflects a 
variation in their genotypes (i.e., the genetic code constituting a 
“blueprint” for a given phenotype).17 Such variation in the genotype can 
occur because of randomly occurring mutations between generations or 
the blending of genetic material in the process of sexual reproduction. 
Variations that result in a subsequent benefit to the new generation are 
sustained and propagated in a process known as natural selection. Over 
long periods of time, minor variations accumulate and result in 
significant alterations. Thus, the modern Theory of Evolution is 
fundamentally an accounting for the variety of species by a historical 
process of intergenerational variation, driven by genetic modification and 
natural selection, from a common ancestor.18
Charles Darwin is typically credited with introducing the concept of 
evolution by natural selection.19 Although his ideas have proven 
exceptionally powerful as an organizational and explanatory theory for 
biology, Darwin was not the first naturalist to propose the concept of 
evolution. Other theorists, such as Jean Baptiste Lamarck, suggested that 
variation among modern species was likely due to a process of gradual 
evolution from simple species to more complex ones.20 However, Darwin 
was the first to propose that the evolution of species was due to the 
relative advantage conveyed to certain phenotypic variations within a 
species—those better suited to survival and reproduction will reproduce 
more often, according to Darwin, thus leading to a predominance of the 
 15. R. J. BERRY, NEO-DARWINISM 2 (1982). 
 16. Id. at 5. 
 17. See generally id. 
 18. Id. at 16–26. 
 19. See NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 420 (3d ed. 1993). 
 20. Id. at 424. Lamarck is famous for his notions of “use and disuse”—whereby 
characteristics of an organism adapt, during its lifetime, to fill the organism’s survival needs—and 
“inheritance”—whereby the adaptations are passed hereditarily to the adapted organism’s 
descendents. Id. 
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advantageous phenotypic variation in subsequent generations.21 In other 
words, optimal phenotypes emerged and gained dominance through a 
process of unguided survival of the fittest, otherwise known as “natural 
selection.” Darwin’s notion of evolution by natural selection was 
eventually merged with Mendelian genetics, which offered an underlying 
explanation for the phenotypic variation within species that fueled 
Darwinian evolution.22 Together, the systematic study of genetics and the 
process of natural selection have yielded a powerful analytical system, 
known as neo-Darwinism, capable of accounting for the wide variety and 
complexity of earthly species.23
Since its introduction by Darwin, the Theory of Evolution has been 
modified and adjusted to better account for empirical data. While 
Darwin’s basic framework of evolution by natural selection still forms 
the core of evolutionary theory, some aspects of the current theory 
appear to contradict Darwin’s ideas. One particularly salient example is 
the notion of “punctuated equilibrium,” which was formulated to explain 
the relatively rapid appearance of new species in the evolutionary 
timeline.24 Darwin believed that natural selection leads to gradual, 
smooth evolution of species in the direction of ever-increasing 
complexity and optimity over time.25 This model fails to account for 
anomalous periods of rapid diversification of species revealed by the 
fossil record.26 Modern theorists, such as Niles Eldredge and Stephen 
Gould, have proposed mechanisms to account for these short periods of 
rapid variation that occur between longer periods of relative evolutionary 
stasis.27 While punctuated equilibrium, as this modern theory is called,28 
may seem to contradict evolutionary theory, it is best read as the type of 
minor adjustment all scientific theories undergo as the available data 
sample grows. In fact, at least one scientist has argued that Eldredge and 
Gould’s hypothesis is “something that followed from long-accepted 
conventional Darwinism, properly understood.”29 Another classic 
example of an accepted alteration to Darwin’s original theory is the 
incorporation of Mendelian genetics, now a fundamental component of 
 21. Id. at 427–28. 
 22. Id. at 439; see also BERRY, supra note 15. 
 23. Neo-Darwinism is so potent and useful as a description of the evolution of species on 
Earth that “[t]he scientific consensus around evolution is overwhelming.” STEERING COMM. ON SCI. 
AND CREATIONISM & NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, SCIENCE AND CREATIONISM: A VIEW FROM THE 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 28 (2d. ed. 1999) [hereinafter STEERING COMM.]. 
 24. See CAMPBELL, supra note 19, at 469. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 236 (1996). 
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the modern understanding of evolution.30
The details of the Theory of Evolution are likely to continue 
evolving as scientists adapt the theory’s structure to account for newly 
discovered data. However, one key feature of the theory is certain to 
remain constant: no matter how many adjustments are made, the Theory 
of Evolution will always be a naturalistic model.31 In other words, the 
Theory of Evolution will always be one that explains the emergence of 
species exclusively in terms of observable, natural phenomena. This 
quality is crucial in differentiating the theory from many of its 
competitors, including the Intelligent Design hypothesis. 
 
B.  Intelligent Design 
 
Although this paper focuses on the metaphysical claims of Intelligent 
Design—and argues that these claims alone are likely sufficient to render 
the inclusion of the Intelligent Design hypothesis in public school 
science curricula unconstitutional—it is useful to at least briefly explore 
the history of the hypothesis’s intellectual development.32 The modern 
Intelligent Design hypothesis has its roots in the work of eighteenth-
century theologian William Paley, who famously argued that design 
could be inferred from complexity, precision, and purpose.33 In his 
treatise, Natural Theology—or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes 
of the Deity Collected from the Appearances of Nature, Paley employed 
the example of a mechanical watch found in a field.34 Faced with such a 
stunning specimen of complex, precise, and purposeful machinery, the 
watch’s finder would be compelled to presume that the watch was 
created by a “maker . . . who comprehended its construction, and 
 30. Although unaware of Mendel’s work, Darwin had realized the need for some mechanism, 
which he deemed “chance,” to explain the appearance and transmission of variations between 
generations. Darwin’s “chance” was eventually supplanted by Mendelian genetics. WALTER J. 
WILKINS, SCIENCE AND RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 20–21 (1987). 
 31. By many accounts, Darwin’s main goal was to remove the supernatural from biology and 
replace it with a natural mechanism. See id. at 18. Darwin’s theory thus represented a form of 
methodological revolution in the study of biology. Id. at 27. 
 32. Some scholars and courts—including Judge Jones in the recent Kitzmiller case—have 
focused on Intelligent Design’s intellectual pedigree, arguing that the hypothesis’ fundamentalist 
Christian roots reveal a surreptitious religious motive on the part of its advocates. While this 
argument is powerful, this paper argues that the religious motivations of those who developed 
Intelligent Design are not the sole reason that its inclusion in public school curricula is 
constitutionally problematic. Rather, this paper demonstrates that the inherently religious nature of 
the Intelligent Design hypothesis—irrespective of the affiliation of its proponents—leads to potential 
conflict with the Establishment Clause. 
 33. See DAWKINS, supra note 29, at 4. 
 34. See generally WILLIAM PALEY, NATURAL THEOLOGY (2d ed. 1828). 
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designed its use.”35 Paley’s general argument resurfaced in the 1989 
supplemental biology textbook Of Pandas and People.36 In 1991, law 
professor Phillip Johnson published Darwin on Trial, which outlined an 
attack on the methodological naturalism that underlies the Theory of 
Evolution.37 The Intelligent Design movement gained steam in 1996 with 
the publication of Lehigh University biochemist Michael Behe’s critique 
of Darwinism, Darwin’s Black Box.38 Soon after Behe’s work was 
published, mathematician and philosopher William Dembski added to 
the growing Intelligent Design literature with a series of publications 
including The Design Inference (1998), Mere Creation (1998), and 
Intelligent Design (1999). In 1999, Johnson and other fellows of the 
Discovery Institute’s Center for Renewal of Science and Culture 
prepared the now-infamous “Wedge Document,” which outlined a plan 
to “replace [a materialist view of science] with a science consonant with 
Christian and theistic convictions.”39
The rise of the Intelligent Design hypothesis in recent years has been 
attributed to the creationists’ defeats in court, such as those in Epperson40 
and Edwards,41 coupled with their persistent desire to incorporate theistic 
notions into the public school science curriculum.42 The Intelligent 
Design hypothesis is merely the most recent incarnation of the basic 
creationist analytical system.43 It is also the subtlest incarnation to date: 
while the creationist systems of earlier eras were characterized by 
complex, detailed, and dogmatic explanatory theories of the origins of 
life as well as outright identifications of a responsible deity, the 
Intelligent Design hypothesis proposes merely that empirical data 
supports the inference of a vaguely-defined intelligence responsible for 
the emergence of species.44 In this sense, Intelligent Design avoids two 
common pitfalls of the earlier creationist systems: (1) it does not propose 
a complex set of falsifiable historical claims about the origins of life that 
 35. Id. at 5–6. The title of this paper is a clumsy play on Paley’s famous metaphor. 
 36. Eugenie C. Scott, Antievolutionism and Creationism in the United States, 26 ANN. REV. 
OF ANTHROPOLOGY 263, 279 (1997). Pandas was published shortly after the decision in Edwards v. 
Aguillard (discussed infra). For an interesting analysis of the differences between the pre and post-
Edwards draft of Pandas and the implication that the authors substituted Intelligent Design-related 
terminology for more obvious creationist arguments to conform with Edwards, see Kitzmiller v. 
Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 37. See Scott, supra note 36, at 281. 
 38. Id. at 282. 
 39. Discovery Institute Center for Renewal of Science and Culture, The Wedge 4. 
 40. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 41. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 42. See Bob Holmes & James Randerson, A Skeptic’s Guide to Intelligent Design, NEW 
SCIENTIST, July 9, 2005, at 12. 
 43. Id. at 10. 
 44. Id. 
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contradict geological and paleontological evidence, and (2) it does not 
identify, with specificity, the proposed designer of life.45 The first quality 
of Intelligent Design is important mainly from the standpoint of public 
opinion: that Intelligent Design advocates avoid contradicting well-
settled science46 lends a degree of legitimacy to the movement. Because 
it does not squabble with the most concrete and cherished simulacra of 
the Theory of Evolution, Intelligent Design appears to the layman more 
like a competing scientific theory than religious dogma. Also, because 
the Intelligent Design hypothesis lacks an accompanying historical 
narrative, its relation to any specific theological tradition is obscured. 
That Intelligent Design is a religious hypothesis subject to the strictures 
of the First Amendment is thus not immediately apparent. The second 
quality provides the Intelligent Design advocates with additional room 
for constitutional maneuvering: because no deity is identified by name, 
the religious nature of Intelligent Design is less clear than that of earlier 
creationist systems. 
A handful of variations of the Intelligent Design hypothesis exist, but 
they all share a common structure: each represents a critique of the 
naturalist Theory of Evolution on scientific grounds that culminates in 
the conclusion that the diversity of earthly species could only have 
emerged as a result of the purposeful actions of an intelligent agent. As 
used by Intelligent Design proponents, the term “intelligence” implies 
several qualities, including: (1) the ability to plan, (2) at least 
rudimentary knowledge and competency in chemistry and biology, and 
(3) purpose.47 Taken together, the intelligent designer differs from the 
unguided natural processes that underlie the Theory of Evolution in the 
sense that the designer can construct molecules (or organisms) in a 
systematic, directed manner for an intended purpose.48 The logical 
structure of the arguments offered in support of the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis can be understood by focusing on a syllogism underlying the 
 45. Id. at 11. 
 46. For instance, many Intelligent Design proponents are often careful to acknowledge the 
truth of “microevolution,” a term used to describe the variation within a species from one generation 
to the next. See id. at 10. This is prudent because microevolution is readily observed in laboratory 
experiments and fieldwork (one significant example of real-world microevolution is the gradual 
acquisition of drug-immunity in pathogens). Also, Intelligent Design advocates do not overtly 
contradict the general historical timeline typically associated with the Theory of Evolution or the 
notion of a common ancestor. See id. 
 47. Intelligent Design theorist William Dembski defines intelligence as the ability of the 
designer to choose. See William Dembski, Intelligent Design as a Theory of Information, 49 PERSP. 
ON SCI. AND CHRISTIAN FAITH 180, 186–88 (1997). 
 48. The Intelligent Design hypothesis is, in this sense, a teleological model of the origin of 
species, explaining the emergence of complexity in terms of purposeful action. The modern Theory 
of Evolution, with its basis in undirected natural selection, eschews teleological explanation. 
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naturalist Theory of Evolution. The validity of the Theory of Evolution 
depends on the truth of the proposition that the current species on Earth 
may be traced back through a lineage of natural processes. This 
proposition must apply in a discrete form at every step in the 
evolutionary timeline and at every location in the evolutionary tree, so 
that each variation may be understood as the effect of a natural cause; if, 
at some point in evolutionary history, the naturalist proposition fails, then 
the naturalistic Theory of Evolution cannot provide a comprehensive 
accounting of the origin of species. Those who advocate Intelligent 
Design exploit this fact, claiming that “gaps” exist in the naturalist causal 
chain.49 According to Intelligent Design theorists, these supposed gaps in 
the Theory of Evolution evince design, which one researcher defines as 
“the purposeful arrangement of parts.”50
The various versions of the Intelligent Design hypothesis therefore 
do not differ in logical structure; rather, the distinction appears in the 
support—in the form of the specific “gap” claimed to exist in the 
naturalist theory or the type of argument employed to demonstrate that a 
gap in fact exists—provided for the hypothesis that life’s complexity is 
due to purposeful design by an intelligent agent. William Dembski takes 
a probabilistic approach, arguing that the complexity and specificity of 
life renders its emergence simply too improbable without the direction of 
an intelligent, purposeful designer.51 Along this vein, Dembski defines an 
“explanatory filter” which allows one to identify the cause—from three 
possible options: regularity, chance, and design—of an observed event.52 
Dembski claims that evolution by natural selection, which focuses on 
regularity and chance, is insufficient to account for the emergence of the 
“complex, specified information” that comprises organic life.53 Thus, the 
source of such information—and, by implication, life—must be an 
intelligent designer.54 Biochemist Michael Behe takes this argument one 
step further, asserting that while gradual evolution from simpler organic 
systems to more complex ones is possible (and, in fact, happens), such a 
process is insufficient to comprehensively account for the origins of 
life.55 Behe starts by noting that life is composed of component parts—
cells, organs, and systems—that, according to the Theory of Evolution, 
arose in their current form through gradual variation from more primitive 
 49. MICHAEL BEHE, DARWIN’S BLACK BOX 187 (1996). 
 50. Id. at 193. 
 51. See generally WILLIAM DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN INFERENCE: ELIMINATING CHANCE 
THROUGH SMALL PROBABILITIES (1998). 
 52. Id. at 37. 
 53. Dembski, supra note 47, at 181–86. 
 54. Id. at 186–88. 
 55. BEHE, supra note 49, at 23–25. 
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precursors.56 He then asserts that we can infer design of a component part 
that is both (1) too complexly organized to have arisen spontaneously 
and (2) too streamlined and/or interconnected to function in a simpler 
form; component parts that satisfy these two criteria are said to be 
“irreducibly complex.”57 The logic of Behe’s argument is simple: if 
gradual variation (a hallmark of evolution by natural selection) cannot 
account for the origins of irreducibly complex parts, then those parts 
must have appeared suddenly. Since the spontaneous organization of 
molecules into a complicated organic system is exceedingly unlikely, it 
is more reasonable to infer that these parts were designed. Behe cites 
several examples of supposed irreducibly complex systems from the 
realm of biology—including bacterial cilia and flagella,58 the blood 
coagulation cascade,59 antibodies,60 and AMP biosynthesis61—that, in his 
view, evince design.62
Despite the different approaches taken by various Intelligent Design 
theorists to support their critique of the Theory of Evolution, each 
culminates in a common inference: namely, the necessity of a designer. 
In other words, in contrast to the Theory of Evolution, the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis claims that the complexity underlying life on Earth 
could not have arisen without the interference of a purposeful and 
capable designer at some point in our planet’s history. It is this proposed 
designer that is the key difference between the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis and the Theory of Evolution and, as will be shown below, it is 
a concept that is fundamentally religious. 
 
 
 
 
 
 56. Id. at 3–23. 
 57. Id. at 194–96. The most famous example of an irreducibly complex system is the 
household mousetrap, which consists of a board, a spring, a lever arm and a latch. If the mousetrap is 
asserted to have evolved in a manner analogous to naturalistic evolution, it must have arisen from 
very simple, initially unconnected component parts (maybe a board, an unbent wire, etc.) to the more 
complex form. Behe asserts that this is unlikely to have happened, because the components by 
themselves are useless for trapping mice; only a complete mousetrap, constructed of the components 
arranged in a very specific manner, is useful for the intended purpose. The mousetrap—a relatively 
simple device—is, according to Behe, therefore irreducibly complex. Id. Numerous naturalists have 
attacked the power and relevance of this analogy. See, e.g., Keith Robison, Irreducible Complexity 
or Irreproducible Irreducibility? (1996–97), http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/behe/review.html. 
 58. BEHE, supra note 49, at 51–73. 
 59. Id. at 74–97. 
 60. Id. at 117–39. 
 61. Id. at 140–61. 
 62. Id. at 187–208. 
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III.  ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE FRAMEWORK 
 
The proper relationship between religion and the state is defined by 
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states in 
pertinent part, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”63 Read literally, the 
First Amendment Religion Clauses apply only to acts of the United 
States Congress. However, the clauses have, over time, come to stand for 
the prohibition of state action—whether legislative or executive, federal, 
or state-level—that either affects an establishment of religion or burdens 
the free exercise of religious beliefs.64 The inclusion of the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis in public school curricula raises issues that primarily 
involve religious establishment.65 To gain an understanding of whether 
the Intelligent Design hypothesis runs afoul of the Establishment Clause, 
one must determine whether the Intelligent Design hypothesis implicates 
“religion” and whether its inclusion in the public schools qualifies as a 
“law respecting an establishment of religion.” 
 
A.  Definition of “Religion” 
 
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment only purport to 
regulate “religion;”66 their application is limited by the text of the 
Amendment to those teachings, beliefs, and groups that legitimately 
qualify as religion. Thus, before we evaluate the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis under the lens of the Establishment Clause, we must first 
determine whether the hypothesis involves religion. Unfortunately, no 
explicit definition of the term “religion” may be found in the text of the 
Constitution. However, several extra-constitutional sources help to 
construct a useful and somewhat rigorous definition of “religion” as it is 
applied in the First Amendment. First, the words of influential Framers 
of the Constitution provide some clues to the original intent of the 
Religion Clauses. Second, there is a small amount of relevant federal 
case law that addresses the issue. Finally, some core characteristics of 
religion may be extracted from the work of anthropologists who have 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 64. See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253–58 (1963). 
 65. It has been suggested that the general curricular conflict between the Theory of Evolution 
and the Intelligent Design hypothesis raises a complementary issue involving the Free Exercise 
Clause—namely, whether teaching a scientific theory that, by implication, contradicts certain 
closely-held religious convictions is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. See McLean v. Ark. Bd. 
of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1273–74 (E.D. Ark. 1982). The validity of such a claim is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 66. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
  
179] ONE NATION, UNDER . . . THE WATCHMAKER? 191 
 
studied religion. These sources, and a proposed test for religiosity of an 
analytical system such as the Intelligent Design hypothesis or the Theory 
of Evolution, are described below. 
 
1.  Views of the framers 
 
The expressed views of the Framers can often illuminate the 
intended meaning of ambiguous terms that appear in the Constitution. In 
the case of the Religion Clauses, the writings of two influential 
framers—James Madison and Thomas Jefferson—provide insight into 
the originally-intended definition of the term “religion.” In his Memorial 
and Remonstrance, Madison referred to religion as “the duty which we 
owe to our Creator, and the manner of discharging it.”67 This definition 
includes three distinct components: (1) the notion of a creator, (2) a duty 
owed to the creator, and (3) guidelines for fulfilling this duty. Jefferson, 
in his Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, implicitly defined 
“religion” through a non-exhaustive list of extant religions.68 The list 
included only faiths demonstrating sophisticated theologies and ritual 
practices and centered on belief in a supernatural entity, but Jefferson 
noted that his Act was intended to be “universal” and to apply to 
“infidel[s] of every denomination.”69 It is notable that each of the faiths 
listed by Jefferson would qualify as a religion under Madison’s creation-
centric definition. 
 
2.  Relevant jurisprudence 
 
The Supreme Court has remained largely silent on the issue of the 
definition of religion. However, a few opinions have flirted with the 
definitional question. Writing for the Court in Davis v. Beason, Justice 
Field largely echoed the words of Madison, defining religion as “one’s 
view of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of 
reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.”70 
Justice Brennan, in Edwards v. Aguillard, described the belief “that a 
supernatural being created humankind” as a “religious viewpoint.”71 
Taken together, these two opinions clearly identify the belief in a 
 67. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS 
(1785) (quoting VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 16 (1776)). 
 68. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS BEARING ON SUNDAY LEGISLATION 133 n.1 (William Addison 
Blakely ed., rev. enl. ed. 1911). The religions listed by Jefferson included Judaism, Christianity, 
Islam and Hinduism. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). 
 71. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1986). 
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supernatural creator as a religious notion. 
Two other notable Supreme Court opinions have implied an 
expanded definition of religion, albeit in the context of the Free Exercise 
Clause. In Torcaso v. Watkins, Justice Black implied the possibility of 
non-theistic religion, insisting that the state may not “aid those religions 
based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions 
founded on different beliefs.”72 Unfortunately, Justice Black’s opinion 
did not elaborate on the particular qualities of these non-theistic belief 
systems that would qualify them as religions. In United States v. Seeger, 
the Court interpreted the definition of the term “religion” as applied in 
Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Services Act.73 
Despite the fact that the statute employed a definition of religion that was 
explicitly theistic, the Court read the Act’s definition to subsume non-
theistic belief systems that “occup[y] a place in the life of [their] 
possessor[s] parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God.”74 
However, the Court stopped short of labeling any and all belief systems 
“religious,” noting that the statute could exclude “essentially political, 
sociological, or philosophical views” from protection.75 Seeger thus 
implies that, in addition to theistic belief systems, some, but not all, non-
theistic belief systems may qualify as religion. 
At least one federal circuit court has attempted to clarify the fuzzy 
boundary between religion and non-religion. Judge Adams of the Third 
Circuit formulated an initial definition of religion in Malnak v. Yogi76 
and later refined the definition in Africa v. Pennsylvania.77 Known as the 
“Adams Test,” the definition notes three indicia of religious belief 
systems: religious systems (1) “address[] fundamental and ultimate 
questions having to do with deep and imponderable matters,” (2) are 
“comprehensive in nature” and (3) often involve “formal and external 
signs” such as organized rituals, recognized experts, and official texts.78 
One salient feature of this test is that it includes no explicit requirement 
of belief in the supernatural or a creator. However, while the supernatural 
creator concept is not a necessary condition under the Adams Test, it is 
surely a sufficient condition. After all, it is difficult to imagine a clearer 
attempt to “address fundamental and ultimate questions” than the 
proposal that a supernatural being created the universe. 
 72. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). 
 73. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 74. Id. at 165–66. 
 75. Id. at 165. 
 76. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 77. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 78. Id. at 1032. 
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3.  Anthropological understanding 
 
The legal sources, especially the relevant Supreme Court precedent, 
leave us with a rather ill-defined understanding of exactly what belief 
systems qualify as religions worthy of First Amendment scrutiny. While 
it is clear that the major theological faiths, their “equivalents,” and even 
some non-theistic systems qualify as religion, there is no underlying 
unity that ties these views together. One source that might shed some 
light on the definitional question is the work of anthropologists of 
religion. As one legal scholar has argued, “‘Religion’ in the First 
Amendment [m]eans [r]eligion.”79 If this was the intent of the Framers, 
then there is no better source for a definition of religion than the work of 
those who catalogue and categorize human religious practices. After all, 
religion is fundamentally a term to describe specific collections of beliefs 
and practices of human beings. It is therefore appropriate to study these 
behaviors in an effort to define the term that purports to classify them. 
According to James Donovan, the various anthropological 
definitions of religion fall into four distinct categories based on the 
particular criterion—content, behavior, mental effect, or function—
applied to sort religion from non-religion.80 Because the Religion 
Clauses are most powerful as applied to either protect or prohibit certain 
beliefs, expressions, and behaviors, the most useful definition for the 
purposes of constructing a legal definition of religion is likely to be of 
either the content-based or behavioral variety. For the limited purpose of 
this paper, which evaluates the constitutionality of teaching the idea of 
Intelligent Design, it is sufficient to focus our attention on the 
construction of a content-based definition. 
Several anthropologists have proposed content-based definitions of 
religion. Anthropologist Edward Tylor asserts that the “minimum 
definition of religion” is a belief in the supernatural.81 Similar views have 
been expressed by Anthony Wallace and Raymond Firth.82 Emile 
Durkheim proposes a definition of religious belief based on the 
distinction between the “sacred” and the “profane.”83 The supernatural 
deity so common to religion is merely a special—albeit the most 
common—example of a “sacred being.” Interestingly, Durkheim 
 79. Eduardo Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 802 (1997). 
 80. James M. Donovan, Defining Religion, in SELECTED READINGS IN THE ANTHROPOLOGY 
OF RELIGION 61, 72 (Stephen D. Glazier & Charles A. Flowerday eds., 2003). 
 81. Paul Bloom, Is God an Accident?, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2005, at 105. 
 82. See Donovan, supra note 80, at 72. 
 83. “The division of the world into two domains, one containing all that is sacred and the 
other all that is profane—such is the distinctive trait of religious thought.” EMILE DURKHEIM, THE 
ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 34 (1995). 
  
194 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 22 
 
explicitly notes that “the fundamental task of sacred beings has been to 
maintain the normal course of life by positive action.”84 Pascal Boyer, in 
his book Religion Explained: the Evolutionary Origins of Religious 
Thought, constructs a multi-faceted definition of religion.85 Among the 
components of religion listed by Boyer is belief in supernatural agents 
capable of exercising practical control over the events of the natural 
world.86 According to Boyer, religions range from simple forms—in 
which adherents believe in supernatural agents that affect their lives, 
practice rituals to appease these agents, share their beliefs with an 
identifiable group, and recognize spiritual experts in their community—
to highly sophisticated theological systems that provide throngs of 
adherents with uniform, official doctrine concerning the role of supreme 
deities in matters of universal import.87
In summary, the content-based definitions proposed by 
anthropologists typically center on belief in the supernatural. But, how 
useful is this definition? Donovan asserts that “[a] content definition 
highlighting supernaturalisms would be the best kind of definition if it 
collocated phenomena as we demand,” but notes that such definitions are 
both under- and over-inclusive.88 Supernatural content-based definitions 
are under-inclusive because they fail to identify as “religious” systems—
such as Buddhism—that, despite their lack of supernatural concepts, are 
almost unanimously considered religious. Such definitions are over-
inclusive because they count as “religious” items—such as superstitions 
and folktales—that are generally not considered religious.89 Thus, a 
simple dichotomy of the religious from the non-religious based on the 
inclusion of supernatural concepts maps only roughly our intuitive 
notions about what qualifies as religion. However, while the three 
 84. Id. at 26. Durkheim further notes that religious deities are most often used to account “for 
the normal march of the universe, the movement of the stars, the annual growth of vegetation, the 
perpetuation of species, and so forth.” Id. 
 85. See generally PASCAL BOYER, RELIGION EXPLAINED: THE EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF 
RELIGIOUS THOUGHT (2001). 
 86. Id. at 136–47. The other components Boyer lists are group identity, ritual practices, 
integration of a moral system, the existence of recognized specialists, special beliefs about death and 
(in some cases) the existence of a standardized theology. Unlike belief in supernatural agents, 
however, none of these components is unique to religion. Id. 
 87. Id. at 265–96. According to Boyer, the practical, self-centered, often theoretically 
incoherent or incomplete beliefs in supernatural agents are more typical of religious beliefs than are 
the theoretical, universal, coherent and complete systems that typify the established, theological 
faiths. The latter version has incorporated certain qualities necessary to facilitate the incorporation of 
multiple peoples into a unified religious constituency. See generally id. 
 88. Donovan, supra note 80, at 76–77. 
 89. See id. Durkheim also decries the over-inclusiveness of a content-based definition based 
on the inclusion of supernatural concepts, noting that such a definition would label as religious those 
systems rightly deemed “magical.” 
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content-based definitions of religion introduced above differ significantly 
in their details and sophistication, a careful comparison of the three 
reveals a more precise commonality than mere inclusion of supernatural 
ideas: all three definitions subsume within their bounds belief systems 
that propose causation by one or more supernatural agents, where agency 
is defined roughly as “the abstract quality that is present in animals, 
persons, and anything that appears to move of its own accord, in 
pursuance of its own goals.”90 This common theme provides a foundation 
for a test applicable to the constitutional issues surrounding Intelligent 
Design. 
 
4.  A proposed test 
 
Constructing a rigorous and comprehensive definition of religion is 
an exceedingly difficult task; even expert religious anthropologists 
cannot agree on a common definition. Jurists seeking a test that neatly 
divides religion from non-religion are searching in vain. The traditional 
legal sources discussed above fail to provide a definition of religion that 
is simultaneously rigorous and exhaustive. The term is not clearly 
defined in the text of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the definitional question has been somewhat evasive. While 
the Court has clearly stated that religion includes theological faiths based 
on belief in a supernatural creator and some other non-theistic faiths,91 it 
has failed to articulate a clear boundary between the realms of the 
religious and non-religious. The Third Circuit has elaborated an 
apparently rigorous method to identify religious systems,92 but the test 
was designed primarily for Free Exercise claims and its application has 
therefore been plagued by overzealous rigor.93 Fortunately, a rigorous 
 90. BOYER, supra note 85, at 144. 
 91. See discussion supra Part III.A.2; cases cited supra notes 70–78. 
 92. Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981); Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d 
Cir. 1979). These cases set forth the Adams Test. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 93. E.g., Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F. Supp. 730, 734 (D.N.J. 1983). In Jacques, the District 
Court for New Jersey applied an especially strict reading of the Adams Test, holding that a prison-
based “church” was not a religion within the meaning of the First Amendment. The court based its 
ruling largely on the observation that the church’s doctrines were somewhat vague and did not 
follow necessarily from the nature of the church’s deity. Opinions such as Jacques can likely be 
explained by the policy issues unique to Free Exercise claims applied to supposedly religious 
practices (as opposed to religious beliefs). Religions are relatively easy to found; no special training 
or certification is necessary to start one’s own faith. This fact could be exploited by disingenuous 
practitioners who seek, by fashioning a customized religious doctrine, to shield otherwise illegal or 
unethical behaviors from legal proscription. Courts, faced with the prospect of accommodating 
idiosyncratic belief systems at the expense of public policy, might simply choose to avoid the issue 
by interpreting the definition of “religion” so narrowly as to exclude the controversial system at 
issue from protection. 
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and comprehensive definition of religion is not necessary for analysis 
under the Establishment Clause. In order to prove a violation of the 
Establishment Clause, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that a complete 
religion has been installed; rather, under the Supreme Court’s current 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the plaintiff need only demonstrate 
that the state conduct at issue improperly involves (i.e., respects an 
establishment of) a religious belief or practice.94 Thus, what is required 
is a means to distinguish between those beliefs and practices that are 
religious and those that are not. 
A synthesis of the relevant legal and anthropological efforts to define 
religion reveals at least one element—namely, the attribution of 
causation for natural phenomenon to the work of a supernatural agent 
intervening within the natural order95—that distinguishes religious and 
non-religious belief. Many anthropologists suggest that such notions are 
essential to religious thought.96 While some legal commentators have 
argued that religion may include more than just belief systems that 
involve supernatural agency, almost all recognize such belief systems as 
the baseline for comparison.97 In fact, much of the theoretical work 
regarding the definition of religion—both in jurisprudence and 
anthropology—has focused on what systems besides those that involve 
belief in supernatural agency qualify as religion.98
We can therefore propose a non-exhaustive test that identifies an 
idea as religious if it invokes supernatural agency as the cause of 
observed, natural phenomena. Such a non-exhaustive test, based on the 
notion of supernatural agency, largely avoids the definitional pitfalls 
identified by Donovan. Because it requires supernatural agency and 
application to real-world phenomena, the test minimizes over-
inclusiveness: superstition and magic involve supernatural causation, but 
almost never invoke supernatural agency; folktales are works of fiction 
that do not purport to explain actual, observed phenomena (i.e., they do 
not make historical causal claims). The supernatural agency definition 
does not eliminate the under-inclusiveness problem, but the definition is 
nonetheless quite useful as a legal standard. While the supernatural 
 94. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 95. A special case of the intervening supernatural agent, the idea of a supernatural creator, 
has been especially associated with religion by our nation’s most influential legal scholars. From 
James Madison to Justice Field in Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), to Justice Brennan in 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), belief in a supernatural creator has consistently been 
considered undeniably religious. See generally supra Parts III.A.1–3 for discussion of the definition 
of religion. 
 96. See supra Part III.A.3, with examples including Tylor, Wallace, Firth, and Boyer. 
 97. See supra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2. 
 98. See supra Part III.A.2 for discussion of religious definition jurisprudence and supra Part 
III.A.3 for discussion of anthropological definitions of religion. 
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agency definition may prove under-inclusive in the sense that it fails to 
identify systems that, despite their lack of supernatural agency, should 
legitimately be deemed “religious,” we can be confident that any system 
that includes such notions is, indeed, religious.99 A definition based on 
notions of supernatural agency may therefore apply as a first-cut test, 
identifying ideas that are unambiguously religious and leaving open the 
possibility that a system which fails to meet its criteria may, 
nevertheless, be legitimately religious. 
It is not sufficient, however, to note merely that the proposed legal 
test of religiosity satisfies the concerns of anthropologists; a legal 
definition must also conform to the relevant jurisprudence. The 
supernatural agency test satisfies the latter criteria as well. In fact, in the 
Religion Clause jurisprudence, systems that invoke supernatural agency 
to explain natural phenomena serve as the exemplar against which all 
other systems’ religiosity is judged. The Madisonian view of religion, 
based as it is on belief in a Creator deity,100 is merely a special case of 
belief systems that invoke supernatural agency to explain natural 
phenomena. Jefferson operated under a definition of religion that 
incorporated a general class of theistic beliefs, but every example of faith 
cited by Jefferson in his Act for Establishing Religious Freedom includes 
notions of supernatural agency. The Supreme Court has often applied the 
Madisonian definition of religion.101 On the rare occasions that the Court 
has diverged from Madison’s view, it has moved towards a more 
inclusive definition of religion, by expanding religion to include certain 
non-theistic systems.102 While the Court has found that some systems 
that lack belief in supernatural agency qualify as religion,103 it has never 
held that the notion of supernatural agency fails to qualify as a religious 
belief. Even the Adams Test confirms this view, as it is essentially an 
expansion of the definition of religion outward from a core definition 
based on belief in supernatural agents.104 Defining religious beliefs as 
those that involve supernatural agents generally—as opposed to the 
narrower subclass of theologically sophisticated deities—is consistent 
with the courts’ tendency to apply constitutional protection to a wide 
 99. This is not to say that such systems are religions. As noted earlier, what constitutes a 
complete religion is unclear; it must therefore suffice to identify beliefs and practices that are of a 
religious character. 
 100. MADISON, supra note 67. 
 101. See discussion supra Part III.A.2; cases cited supra notes 70–71. 
 102. See discussion supra Part III.A.2; cases cited supra notes 72–73. 
 103. Id. 
 104. “[T]he important question . . . is how far the constitutional definition of religion extends 
beyond the Theistic formulation; that it comprehends all Theistic faiths has, to my knowledge, not 
been questioned.” Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 203 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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range of legitimately religious beliefs beyond those of the major world 
faiths as well as the universality of Jefferson’s understanding of religion. 
The supernatural agency test therefore provides a paradigm that, at 
least in part, harmonizes the relevant Religion Clause jurisprudence with 
the anthropological understanding of religious belief. Although it is 
under-inclusive in that it does not identify non-theistic views as religious, 
the supernatural agency test serves as a good “first cut” at determining a 
belief system’s religiosity. As it turns out, the supernatural agency test is 
all that is needed to determine whether the Intelligent Design hypothesis 
is a religious notion. 
 
B.  Establishment Clause Tests 
 
The Supreme Court has, over the past several decades, established at 
least three tests for evaluating whether a government action complies 
with the Establishment Clause. These three tests are introduced below. 
 
1.  The Lemon test 
 
The first test applied by the Supreme Court to evaluate 
Establishment Clause claims was formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.105 
The Lemon test specifies three requirements of government conduct; if 
the conduct fails on any one of the three, it violates the Establishment 
Clause. “[T]he government conduct in question (1) must have a secular 
purpose, (2) must have a principal or primary effect that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion, and (3) must not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.”106 The secular purpose prong of the Lemon 
test “aims at preventing [government] from abandoning neutrality and 
acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious 
matters.”107 The second prong dictates that the state “may not place its 
prestige, coercive authority, or resources behind a single religious faith 
or behind religious belief in general.”108 And, the third prong aims to 
maintain administrative separation between the government and religious 
organizations. The Lemon test served as the Supreme Court’s exclusive 
Establishment Clause test in the period between 1971 and 1984,109 but 
 105. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), aff’d 411 U.S. 192 (1973). 
 106. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 485 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Lemon, 430 U.S. at 
612–13), rev’d sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 107. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987). 
 108. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989). 
 109. See id. The lone exception was Marsh v. Chambers, in which the Supreme Court upheld 
the Nebraska legislature’s practice of opening daily sessions with a prayer. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The 
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has since been supplemented with at least two other tests. 
 
2.  Endorsement 
 
The Supreme Court began to retreat from the formal, three-pronged 
structure of the Lemon test in Lynch v. Donnelly.110 In a concurring 
opinion in Lynch, Justice O’Connor proposed an alternative test that 
would find a violation of the Establishment Clause when the government 
conduct either (1) fostered “excessive entanglement with religious 
institutions” or (2) affected an “endorsement or disapproval of 
religion.”111 Although Justice O’Connor’s test has not supplanted the 
Lemon test as the governing standard in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence,112 a plurality of the Court adopted Justice O’Connor’s test 
in County of Allegheny v. ACLU and the Court has since applied it to 
numerous Establishment Clause cases.113
Whether a state action affects an endorsement of religion depends on 
the message the action conveys to a reasonable, objective observer.114 
The Supreme Court defined the role of an objective observer in Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe, noting that “[i]n cases involving 
state participation in a religious activity, one of the relevant questions is 
‘whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative 
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state 
endorsement of [the religious activity at issue].’”115 In determining the 
perception of an objective observer, the court must consider the context 
of the religious activity116 with the understanding that the reasonable, 
decision in Marsh was grounded in the unique history of legislative prayer. See id. 
 110. Lynch v. Donelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 111. Id. at 687–88 (O’Conner, J., concurring). 
 112. In fact, at least one circuit court has read the endorsement test as a mere restatement of 
the Lemon test. “Justice O’Connor’s ‘endorsement’ test effectively collapsed the first two prongs of 
the Lemon test.” Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 486 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 113. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 114. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 869 (2005). 
 115. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 307 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 73, 76 (1985)). 
 116. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (stating that “the effect of the government’s use 
of religious symbolism depends upon its context”). One interesting ambiguity in the endorsement 
test is whether the objective observer must recognize the religious nature of a state policy. Although 
the relevant case law is unclear on this issue, there is good reason to believe that the reasonable, 
objective observer’s detection of a policy’s religiosity is a prerequisite to a finding of 
unconstitutional endorsement. For example, the analysis in Lynch v. Donelly focused on whether the 
policy “sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders.” 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). This 
message is communicated only if the nonadherents to a religion detect that the message is religious 
in nature. Similarly, Laurence Tribe has noted that “[w]hether a given practice constitutes a 
forbidden establishment may ultimately depend on whether most people would view it as religiously 
significant.” LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1187 (2d ed. 1987). 
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objective observer is “presumed to be familiar with the history of the 
government’s actions and competent to learn what history has to 
show.”117
 
3.  Coercion 
 
The third Establishment Clause test applied by the Supreme Court 
was introduced in Lee v. Weisman, in which the Court implied that some 
state policies so clearly violate the Establishment Clause that it is 
unnecessary to evaluate their merits under the Lemon test.118 Writing for 
the Court in Lee, Justice Kennedy enunciated the principle that “at a 
minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise to 
act in a way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or 
tends to do so.’”119 According to the majority in Lee, a junior high school 
violated the Establishment Clause’s prohibition of religious coercion 
when it invited a clergyman to recite “nonsectarian” opening and closing 
prayers at a school graduation ceremony.120 The majority found the 
prayer coercive, despite the fact that both attendance at the graduation 
ceremony as well as participation in the prayer were voluntary.121 The 
Court held that the public and peer pressure on students to “maintain 
respectful silence” during the prayer was coercive.122 This seems to 
imply that the Establishment Clause not only prohibits the state from 
coercing religious exercise, but also forbids any state policy that would 
expose a captive audience—even if attendance is formally voluntary—to 
religious practice. Lee thus clarifies the baseline anti-coercion guarantee 
of the Establishment Clause and sets a rather low bar for what qualifies 
as “coercion.” 
 
 
 
 
 117. McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 869. 
 118. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 119. Id. at 587. (quoting Lynch v. Donelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). The Ninth Circuit has 
apparently taken Justice Kennedy’s characterization of the minimum requirements of the 
Establishment Clause at face value, asserting that where the coercion test is violated by state 
conduct, there is no need to evaluate the conduct under either the Lemon or endorsement tests. See 
Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 120. See Lee, 505 U.S 577. 
 121. Id. at 593. The Court noted that, while attendance was technically voluntary, the 
graduation was such a significant event that it would be improper for the state to “exact religious 
conformity from a student as the price of attending [it].” Id. at 596. 
 122. Id. at 593. 
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IV.  DOES TEACHING INTELLIGENT DESIGN VIOLATE THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE? 
 
Given the recent publicity surrounding the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis, and especially the drive to include material about the 
hypothesis in public school science curricula, it is important to determine 
whether such an inclusion would pass muster under the Establishment 
Clause. The analysis that follows tackles this issue in two parts. First, it 
is established that, despite the sophisticated, scientific quality of the 
support for the Intelligent Design hypothesis, the hypothesis is 
fundamentally a religious notion. Next, the constitutionality of teaching 
religious ideas in public schools is evaluated for three distinct academic 
domains: the hard sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. 
While the Establishment Clause likely prohibits instruction on religious 
ideas—specifically, the Intelligent Design hypothesis—in the context of 
the hard sciences, it is argued that such instruction may be 
constitutionally permissible within the context of the social sciences and 
humanities. 
 
A.  The Intelligent Design Hypothesis Is a Religious Notion 
 
Observers who are exposed to the Intelligent Design hypothesis for 
the first time will likely be struck by its technical and philosophical 
sophistication as well as the vagueness surrounding the identity of the 
hypothesized designer. These qualities do not arise by accident. The 
creationist movement has gradually moved towards ever-more-subtle 
analytical systems consistent with their core belief in a supernatural 
creator. Following on the heels of the Court’s rejection of “balanced 
treatment” statutes, which mandated that the standard Genesis account be 
taught alongside evolution in public schools, the “creation science” 
movement argued for Biblical creation using scientific-sounding 
arguments.123 The courts rejected creation science as an attempt to 
circumvent the Establishment Clause by shrouding religious dogma in a 
cloak of scientific terminology.124 Opponents of the theory of evolution 
then pinned their hopes to the subtler and more abstract Intelligent 
Design hypothesis.125 However, despite its abstraction and the technical 
 123. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 708 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 124. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). “The legislative history therefore reveals 
that the term ‘creation science,’ as contemplated by the legislature that adopted this Act, embodies 
the religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind.” Id. at 
591–92.
 125. Kitzmiller, 400 F.Supp.2d 707. See also Holmes & Randerson, supra note 42. 
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sophistication of its supporting arguments, the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis is no less a religious notion than are Biblical Creation and 
Creation Science. As will be shown below, the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis argues for the conclusion that a supernatural agent has exerted 
control over the natural universe and is, therefore, a religious hypothesis. 
The notion that the Intelligent Design hypothesis is science, and thus not 
religion, is addressed in the subsection that follows. 
 
1.  The intelligent design hypothesis explains natural phenomena by 
positing interference by a supernatural agent. 
 
In its prior incarnations, the creationist analytical system differed 
from the Theory of Evolution in many significant respects. Earlier 
versions of creationism proposed specific narrative accounts of the 
creation of life on Earth—accounts that clearly conflicted with the fossil 
record and genetic research.126 However, the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis takes a much subtler approach. Instead of confronting the 
mountains of scientific data supporting the Theory of Evolution head-on, 
the Intelligent Design theorists apply scientific and mathematical 
rationales to support their hypothesis.127 Prominent Intelligent Design 
advocates even acknowledge the existence of evolutionary processes, 
most notably the process known as “microevolution.”128 Intelligent 
Design therefore represents a shift of the metaphysical fault lines from 
the heart of biological dogma to the frontiers of research in the life 
sciences. Intelligent Design advocates do not contradict the work 
biologists have already completed and verified; rather, they propose that 
the fundamental naturalist framework of science cannot solve those 
biological puzzles that remain, as-of-yet, unsolved.129 It is on this frontier 
that we discover the true distinction between the Theory of Evolution 
and the Intelligent Design hypothesis—namely, that the former searches 
for natural causes at every turn, while the latter allows for (and even 
relies upon) the intervention of supernatural agents in the natural 
universe. 
 126. See generally  CAMPBELL, supra note 19. 
 127. WILLIAM DEMBSKI, INTELLIGENT DESIGN: THE BRIDGE BETWEEN SCIENCE AND 
THEOLOGY 106 (1999) (“What has emerged is a new program for scientific research known as 
intelligent design.”). 
 128. See BEHE, supra note 49, at 22 (“This is not to say that . . . Darwinism fails to explain 
anything (it explains microevolution very nicely) . . . .”). 
 129. DEMBSKI supra note 127, at 112–13. This characteristic of the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis has earned it the unflattering nickname “God in the Gaps Theory” among its detractors—
the idea being that Intelligent Design proponents find room for their theistic beliefs in the gaps of 
scientific understanding (gaps that, over time, inevitably shrink or close). 
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Those who support instruction on the Intelligent Design hypothesis 
often emphasize that the hypothesis never identifies the designer as any 
particular deity, or even as a deity at all.130 However, this purposeful 
ambiguity surrounding the identity of the designer is superficial. The fact 
remains that the designer in the Intelligent Design hypothesis is one that 
acts outside the bounds of the laws of nature; in other words, the designer 
is a supernatural agent. This fact is evident from the admissions of 
Intelligent Design theorists. According to William Dembski, 
“[i]ntelligent design is three things: a scientific research program that 
investigates the effects of intelligent causes; an intellectual movement 
that challenges Darwinism and its naturalistic legacy; and a way of 
understanding divine action. Intelligent design therefore intersects 
science and theology.”131 Other Intelligent Design advocates—including 
Michael Behe, Scott Minnich, and Steven William Fuller—have 
indicated that the Intelligent Design hypothesis necessarily implies the 
intervention of a supernatural agent.132
But the supernatural nature of the intelligent designer is not merely a 
subjective choice of Intelligent Design theorists. Rather, the supernatural 
character of the designer is necessary if, as its advocates assert, 
Intelligent Design is to provide a distinct alternative to the Theory of 
Evolution. As Richard Dawkins has pointed out, “[i]f we want to 
postulate a deity capable of engineering all the organized complexity in 
the world, either instantaneously or by guiding evolution, that deity must 
have been vastly complex in the first place. The creationist . . . simply 
postulates an already existing being of prodigious intelligence and 
complexity.”133 In other words, any designer capable of creating the 
complex, specified information comprising life from scratch must itself 
possess sufficient complexity to carry out the creation. Because the 
Intelligent Design hypothesis proposes the designer as an alternative to 
the emergence of complexity from natural processes, the designer’s 
complexity must have arisen from processes that lie outside the bounds 
of the natural; otherwise, the Intelligent Design hypothesis would be 
forced to rely on naturalistic processes to explain the emergence of the 
necessarily-complex designer from an initial state of simplicity. In other 
words, the Intelligent Design hypothesis without a supernatural creator is 
an Intelligent Design hypothesis that acknowledges Darwinism as the 
explanation for the emergence of the intelligent designer. This watered-
down version of the Intelligent Design hypothesis would not amount to a 
 130. See, e.g., BEHE, supra note 49, at 250–51. 
 131. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
 132. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 720 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 133. DAWKINS, supra note 29, at 316. 
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refutation of the Theory of Evolution, but rather would constitute an 
historical theory that inserts an intelligent, but naturally created, designer 
into the timeline of evolution.134 This is not what the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis proposes; rather, Intelligent Design theorists propose a 
designer that is, by logical necessity, a supernatural agent. 
We can thus determine, based on the admissions of Intelligent 
Design theorists and an argument from logical necessity, that the 
Intelligent Design hypothesis proposes the interference of a supernatural 
agent in the natural world as an explanation for observed phenomena. As 
was shown in Section III.A, attributing causality for natural phenomena 
to a supernatural agent is a fundamentally religious concept. That this 
supernatural agent is not identified by name or attributed 
anthropomorphic qualities is irrelevant.135 Thus, the core proposition of 
the Intelligent Design hypothesis—the key distinction between it and its 
metaphysical competitor, the Theory of Evolution—is a religious notion. 
 
2.  The notion that intelligent design is “science” is irrelevant. 
 
Intelligent Design advocates have argued that the technical 
sophistication of the hypothesis qualifies it as “science,” and, thus 
renders the hypothesis immune from the strictures of the Establishment 
Clause.136 Even assuming the specious first premise of this syllogism to 
be correct, the argument is invalid. The Constitution does not dictate that 
science be taught in public schools. Rather, the Establishment Clause 
prohibits the teaching of religion in public schools.137 So, whether the 
Intelligent Design hypothesis is science or not is irrelevant if it is 
determined that the hypothesis is a religious notion.138 To understand 
 134. The logical possibility that such a designer could affect the evolution of species is not 
controversial. Human beings currently fill this role when they apply selective breeding or 
sophisticated gene-modification techniques to purposefully adjust the course of evolution. 
 135. Pascal Boyer emphasizes the abstraction of the “spirits” the belief in whom forms the 
core of many simplistic religious systems. See BOYER, supra note 85, at 139–40 (noting that the 
Kwaio people of the Solomon Islands are “remarkably vague as concerns the exact nature of the 
adalo [the supernatural agents around which Kwaio religious life revolves].”). 
 136. See Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 736 (noting that defense expert Michael Behe 
“admitted that his broadened definition of science, which encompasses ID, would also embrace 
astrology.”); see also Beckwith, supra note 7, at 470 (characterizing Intelligent Design advocates as 
“a small, though growing, platoon of academics who maintain that intelligent agency, as an aspect of 
scientific theory-making, has more explanatory power  . . . than the blind forces of unguided 
matter.”). Beckwith goes on to argue that methodological naturalism may be discarded as a 
precondition of natural science, opening the door to an expanded definition of science that would 
subsume the Intelligent Design hypothesis. See id. 
 137. See Wexler, supra note 14, at 466. 
 138. The Kitzmiller holding was based in large part upon the notion that the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis does not qualify as science. Although the court’s resolution of this question is certainly 
reasonable, given the predominant philosophical understanding of science, the court operated under 
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why, we must explore the relationship between the realms of scientific 
and religious inquiry, as these realms are typically defined, and then 
examine how the Intelligent Design hypothesis’ location within these 
realms changes—if at all—with the implementation of an expanded 
definition of “science.”139
Science and religion, as we have defined the two, actually fulfill 
quite similar functions. According to our limited test for religiosity, any 
hypothesis that assigns causation for natural phenomena to a supernatural 
agent is a religious idea. Science, at its most fundamental level, also 
seeks to determine the causes of natural phenomena.140 In contrast to 
religion, however, science is limited to the realm of natural causes.141 
According to Harvard evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr, “scientists do 
not invoke the supernatural to explain how the natural world works.”142 
Scientists, in other words, proceed under the limitations of 
methodological naturalism, “the belief that science should explain 
phenomena only in terms of entities and properties that fall within the 
category of the natural, such as by natural laws acting either through 
known causes or by chance . . . .”143
a false presumption that its “conclusion on whether [the Intelligent Design hypothesis] is science. . . . 
is essential to [the court’s] holding that an Establishment Clause violation has occurred . . . .” 
Kitzmiller, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 735. Once the court had determined that the hypothesis was a religious 
idea, determining whether or not it simultaneously qualified as science is irrelevant from a First 
Amendment standpoint. 
 139. It is critical here to note the distinction between the Intelligent Design hypothesis and the 
arguments offered in support of it. While the support for the Intelligent Design hypothesis may arise 
through the scientific processes of observing phenomena and collecting and processing data, the 
hypothesis itself represents a religious notion. 
 140. See ARTHUR PAP, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 251 (1962) 
(stating that “it is indeed true and truistic to say that science, or at least the sciences dealing with 
change (as distinct from purely classificatory sciences), aim at the discovery of causal 
connections.”); see also SAMIR OKASHA, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 49 (2002) (arguing that many 
philosophers favor a general theory of scientific explanation centered on the concept of causality). 
 141. See STEERING COMM., supra note 23, at 25 (“Scientific investigators seek to understand 
natural phenomena by observation and experimentation. Scientific interpretations of facts and the 
explanations that account for them therefore must be testable by observation and experimentation. 
Creationism, intelligent design, and other claims of supernatural intervention in the origin of life or 
of species are not science because they are not testable by the methods of science.”). 
 142. ERNST MAYR, THIS IS BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF THE LIVING WORLD (1997), reprinted 
in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TEACHING ABOUT EVOLUTION AND THE NATURE OF SCIENCE 
43 (1998). 
 143. Edward B. Davis & Robin Collins, Scientific Naturalism, in SCIENCE AND RELIGION 322 
(Gary B. Ferngren ed., 2002). Methodological naturalism is to be contrasted with another related 
principle, ontological naturalism, which implies that “nature is all there is.” Id. According to Davis 
and Collins, “in every discipline today, except in some schools of theology, a strict methodological 
naturalism is observed, and typically an ontological naturalism is presupposed by most of the 
practitioners of these disciplines.” Id. at 327. The latter claim amounts only to an observation about 
the personal epistemologies of many scientists, and does not reflect an overarching principle of 
scientific thought, just as the fact that “many scientists are deeply religious” does not redefine the 
boundaries of science and theology as disciplines. STEERING COMM., supra note 23, at ix. 
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Science and religion, as defined herein, may thus be viewed as two 
different types of what might be called “causal-analytic systems”—i.e., 
systems that seek to identify the causes for observed natural phenomena. 
While causal-analytic systems are often metaphysical systems—systems 
that “attempt to say what reality is”144—they need not be: one may set 
limits on the type of causes that are consistent with the principles of a 
given causal-analytical system without claiming that such limits are 
coincident with the bounds of reality. The key distinction between 
religious and scientific causal-analytic systems is that while the former 
attribute causation to supernatural agents, the latter is limited to the realm 
of natural—that is, observable, testable, repeatable—causes. Thus, 
scientific and religious thought, as we have defined the two, “occupy two 
separate realms” within the same general class of causal-analytic 
systems.145 While both religious systems and sciences are classes of 
causal-analytical systems generally (which also includes causal-
analytical systems, such as superstitions, that are neither religious nor 
scientific), no system is both “religious” and “scientific” according to our 
definitions. The two categories are mutually exclusive. 
What Intelligent Design advocates such as Michael Behe and Francis 
Beckwith argue is that if the definition of science can be expanded 
beyond its classically-defined bounds to accommodate supernatural 
agency, then Intelligent Design would qualify as “science.”146 This may 
certainly be true. However, it is beside the point. Such an expansion of 
the bounds of science would simply reclassify religious systems as a 
subset of scientific systems. It is within this subset that the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis would dwell. Intelligent Design would not, by virtue 
of its inclusion in the broadened definition of science, cease to qualify as 
a religious system; it would simply qualify as both a scientific and a 
religious system. 
Because adjusting the definition of science does not divest the 
Intelligent Design hypothesis of its religious nature, arguments that rely 
on Intelligent Design’s science-like philosophical and technical 
sophistication or the argument that a requirement of methodological 
naturalism is philosophically arbitrary are constitutionally irrelevant. 
Whether the Intelligent Design hypothesis is nominally science or 
supported by scientific arguments, the hypothesis is unequivocally 
religious. Therefore, inclusion of the Intelligent Design hypothesis in 
public school curricula is subject to the strictures of the Establishment 
Clause. 
 144. ROBERT C. SOLOMON, THE BIG QUESTIONS 88 (1982). 
 145. STEERING COMM., supra note 23, at ix. 
 146. See supra note 136. 
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B.  Intelligent Design and the Establishment Clause Tests 
 
Given that the Intelligent Design hypothesis is a religious notion, we 
must determine whether the Establishment Clause prohibits its inclusion 
in the public school curriculum. The presentation of religious ideas is not 
off-limits to the state in all circumstances. The Supreme Court has 
allowed state association with religious ideas in several non-educational 
contexts, including daily prayers at a state legislature147 and the display 
of religious symbols on municipal property.148 Additionally, the Court 
has hinted at contextual distinctions that would allow the presentation of 
religious concepts in public school.149 A rationale for these distinctions is 
explored below, followed by a constitutional analysis of religious 
instruction in the three main academic domains: the hard sciences, the 
social sciences, and the humanities. 
 
1.  Constitutional analysis depends on the academic domain 
 
While the Establishment Clause generally stands for the proposition 
that all religions and non-religions are equal under the law, not all 
courses of study are equal under the Establishment Clause. Justice 
Fortas, in a 1968 opinion that nullified (on Establishment Clause 
grounds) a state law prohibiting the teaching of Darwinian theory in 
public schools, noted that “study of religions and of the Bible from a 
literary and historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular 
program of education, need not collide with the First Amendment’s 
prohibition.”150 Justice Fortas’ view represents an intuition that the 
constitutionality of public school instruction on religious principles 
depends on the academic domain in which the principles are presented. 
This intuition has been echoed by legal scholars such as Kent Greenawalt 
and Jay Wexler, who argue for a greater infusion of religion in public 
school humanities and social science courses.151
What lies behind these intuitive notions of a constitutionally 
meaningful distinction between religious concepts as taught in the 
various academic domains? Research by educational theorists examining 
the phenomenon of “domain differences” in education—the notion that 
 147. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
 148. See Lynch v. Donelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 149. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968); Abington Sch. Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). 
 150. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106. 
 151. See Kent Greenawalt, Teaching About Religion in the Public Schools, 18 J.L. & POL. 329 
(2002); see also Jay Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, 
Civic Education and the Constitution, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159 (2002). 
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students and instructors make epistemological distinctions between 
knowledge obtained in different academic domains—may provide one 
explanation for the instinctive desire of legal scholars to differentiate 
between the Establishment Clause consequences of religion as taught in 
various contexts. Educational psychologists have documented 
differences in students’ and teachers’ perception of the epistemological 
quality of knowledge associated with the various fields of academic 
study. For example, empirical studies demonstrate that students tend to 
associate mathematics with certainty and uniqueness of knowledge and 
to view mathematics instructors as authoritative sources of knowledge in 
the subject.152 One study illuminated distinct attitudes on the part of fifth-
grade students towards mathematics and social studies: while the 
substance of mathematics courses was viewed as “fixed and immutable,” 
knowledge in social studies courses was seen as “less sharply 
defined.”153 The same study also indicated that, while students are 
confident in their ability to learn social studies through independent 
study, they were more likely to believe mathematics knowledge can only 
be obtained with the aid of a teacher.154 Other researchers investigating 
middle school and high school students’ epistemological attitudes 
towards the sciences have suggested that, similar to mathematics, 
students view the sciences as conveying knowledge that is factual, 
certain, independent of context, and dependent on authority for 
justification.155 Another study indicates that first-year college students’ 
epistemological perceptions of science and psychology differ  
 
 
 
 152. See Magdalene Lampert, When the Problem Is Not the Question and the Solution Is Not 
the Answer. Mathematical Knowing and Teaching, 27 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 29 (1990); see also A. 
Schoenfeld, Learning to Think Mathematically: Problem Solving, Metacognition and Sense Making 
in Mathematics, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MATHEMATICS TEACHING AND LEARNING 334 
(Douglas A. Grouws ed., 1992). 
 153. Susan S. Stodolsky, et al., Student Views About Learning Math and Social Studies, 28 
AM. EDUC. RES. J. 89, 110 (1991). The authors suggest that this difference may be due to the 
divergent manners in which the two subjects are taught. While mathematics courses at the 
elementary level rarely involve “[a]pplication, experimentation, discovery or inquiry,” courses in 
social studies offer “more avenues of access to learning.” Id. at 112. 
 154. Id. at 105. This is an important distinction for our purposes, as other research 
demonstrates a similarity between the role of instructor-as-authority in the sciences and religion. 
This topic is discussed further in the subsequent subsections. 
 155. See Barbara K. Hofer & Paul R. Pintrich, The Development of Epistemological Theories: 
Beliefs About Knowledge and Knowing and Their Relation to Learning, 67 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 88, 
126 (1997) (citing W. M. Roth & A. Roychoudhury, Physics Students’ Epistemologies and Views 
About Knowing and Learning, 31 J. OF RES. IN SCI. TEACHING 5 (1994), and S. Carey & C. Smith, 
On Understanding the Nature of Scientific Knowledge, 28 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGIST 235 (1993)). 
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markedly.156 These students 
 
saw knowledge in science as more certain and unchanging than in 
psychology; were more likely to regard personal knowledge and 
firsthand experience as a basis for justification of knowing in 
psychology than in science; viewed authority and expertise as the 
source of knowledge more in science than in psychology; and 
perceived that in science, more than in psychology, truth is attainable 
by experts.157  
 
Although many questions about differences in epistemological 
perception across academic domains remain unanswered, the current 
research indicates that students, from at least the fifth grade through their 
college years, perceive mathematical and scientific knowledge as more 
authoritative and factual than knowledge learned in the social sciences 
and humanities.158
Another possible explanation for making a constitutionally-relevant 
distinction between academic domains is the observation that course 
labels often act as a proxy for significant differences in the way causal-
analytic systems are treated in various academic contexts. Courses in 
mathematics and the so-called “hard sciences”—physics, chemistry, and 
biology—generally provide students with instruction in the underlying 
theory and application of a specific causal-analytic system.159 Students 
 156. See Barbara Hofer, Dimensionality and Disciplinary Differences in Personal 
Epistemology, 25 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 378 (2000). 
 157. Id. at 394. 
 158. Although the results are somewhat preliminary, research indicates that the degree to 
which students’ epistemological perception differs between the various academic domains varies as 
a function of age. See Hofer & Pintrich, supra note 155, at 120–23. At an early age, students 
perceive knowledge received in all of the disciplines as factual, determinable and certain; younger 
students are more likely to view teachers as authority figures than are older students. The older a 
student becomes, the more likely she is to perceive differences in the nature of knowledge learned in 
the various fields, and the less likely she is to attribute authority to teachers in the humanities and 
social sciences. See id. at 121 (noting that there is general agreement that, as children move towards 
adulthood, “the view of knowledge is transformed from one in which knowledge is right or wrong to 
a position of relativism and then to a position in which individuals are active constructors of 
meaning, able to make judgments and commitments in a relativistic context.”). Thus, the rationale 
for inclusion of religious material in the social sciences and humanities is most applicable to older 
students who exhibit a tendency to differentiate between the epistemological qualities of knowledge 
gained in the two domains. 
 159. See Richard A Duschl & Richard J. Hamilton, Introduction: Viewing the Domain of 
Science Education, in PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATIONAL 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 5 (Richard A Duschl & Richard J. Hamilton eds., 1992) (“The process of 
science is one of developing and testing theories to explain phenomena. . . . Science curricula need 
to be built around the development, testing, and restructuring of scientific theories if students are to 
‘do science,’ and not simply learn ‘about science.’”); see also JANET DONALD, LEARNING TO THINK: 
DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 41 (2002). 
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are generally expected to apply this system to a set of problems on 
homework sets and examinations to generate the “correct” answer (i.e., 
the answer that is consistent with the causal-analytical system’s axioms). 
The correct answer is typically an effect which, according to the causal-
analytical system, results from specific causes in a particular manner.160 
For example, students enrolled in an introductory course in physics will 
be instructed on the fundamentals of Newtonian mechanics and will be 
expected to apply this system of cause-and-effect to analyze hypothetical 
problems that represent real-world phenomena. As presented in the hard 
sciences, a causal-analytic system is to be taken as a relatively accurate 
model of the universe’s functional machinery. 
Although courses in the social sciences—history, psychology, 
sociology, and economics—may include material on specific causal-
analytic belief systems (e.g., religious beliefs, scientific theories, political 
philosophies, etc.), these systems often serve merely as an impetus 
driving the true focus of a humanities course: human behavior.161 The 
social sciences typically deal with at least two tiers of causal-analytic 
systems. On the upper tier is the overarching causal-analytic system that 
details the effect of human behavior on observed phenomena. A typical 
upper tier claim is “an upward shift in the demand curve without an 
accompanying shift in the supply curve results in a price increase;” here, 
the demand curve shift is a cause that brings about the effect of rising 
prices. On the lower level is a causal-analytic system that describes how 
various parameters affect human behavior. The effect in the lower tier 
causal-analytic system thus becomes the cause in the upper tier system. 
Continuing our example, we may wish to know why consumers in a 
market are more interested in a given product such that the demand curve 
will shift. The causes for such increased demand can be sociological (in 
the case of a new fashion trend), scientific (as when a previously useless 
material is discovered to have technical advantages over its molecular 
competitors) or even religious (for example, where the demand for 
Bibles increases due to an influx of new converts). On the lower tier, the 
personal beliefs of human beings often serve as critical causal factors 
affecting behavior. A comprehensive social science course should 
therefore discuss the effects of particular beliefs on the actions of the 
subjects of study.162 However, because the important inquiry in the social 
 160. Or, in the alternative, the answer might take the form of a particular cause that is 
necessary (or sufficient) to explain the described effect. 
 161. See ARTHUR A. HYDE & MARILYN BIZAR, THINKING IN CONTEXT 166–67 (1989) 
(providing a list of “general orientations” of the social studies and their “key concepts,” each of 
which involves a specific behavior of human beings); see also DONALD, supra note 159, at 134. 
 162. See Donald H. Bragaw & H. Michael Hartoonian, Social Studies: The Study of People in 
Society, in CONTENT OF THE CURRICULUM 226 (Allan A. Glatthorn ed., 2d ed. 1995) (advocating 
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sciences is not whether a particular belief is right or wrong but, rather, 
how it can be expected to affect the believer’s actions, an evaluation of 
personal causal-analytic systems can be accomplished without presuming 
the system’s “truth.” For example, students of modern American history 
might study the religious beliefs of the “Heaven’s Gate” cult in order to 
understand how their eschatology led to a mass suicide. These students, 
however, need not be asked to take a position on whether the predictions 
of the group’s leaders—namely, that the members’ suicide would enable 
them to board a comet-trailing spaceship—came to pass. 
The difference, then, between the physical and social sciences’ 
treatment of causal-analytic systems is this: the hard sciences apply 
causal-analytic systems as a presumably accurate model of observable 
events, while the social sciences allow for a treatment of causal-analytic 
belief systems in such a way that they are valuable not as an accurate 
model of observable events but as a means to predict what the human 
subject of study believes is an accurate model of observable events.163
The constitutional relevance of the distinctions between the hard 
sciences, social sciences, and humanities is discussed in the sections that 
follow. However, before we proceed to this analysis, a word of warning 
is in order. Distinctions based on the treatment of causal-analytical 
systems are likely untenable at the level of course designation; rather, 
such distinctions must be made at the level of particular lessons. It is 
quite possible that a nominal science course could be taught more like a 
history course, in which the evolution of scientific thought from the 
Greek natural philosophers to the modern scientific academia is 
presented. In such a course, the introduction of religious ideas as an 
impetus for a given school of scientific thought might be constitutionally 
proper. On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of history lessons 
taught in a way that violates the Establishment Clause. While it may be 
appropriate to mention Catholicism as a motivation of the Spanish 
conquistadors, for example, a history lesson which characterized the 
Spanish conquest of native populations as the inevitable result of God’s 
Holy Will would certainly run afoul of the First Amendment. The 
relevant difference is that the former theory proposes the historical 
policy studies curricula that “create frames of deliberation in which students’ personal values can be 
juxtaposed with the values and beliefs of others and the larger societies of which they are 
members”). 
 163. This differentiation is quite similar to Greenawalt’s proposal that the truth-value assigned 
to ideas as proposed in various pedagogical contexts should prove constitutionally determinative. 
See Greenawalt, supra note 151, at 339 (stating that “[t]he obvious remedy for present neglect is for 
schools to say more about religion while withholding judgments about religious truth. . . . Much 
depends on particular complaints about particular subject matters, on the depth of treatment that is 
suggested for religion . . . .”). 
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actors’ own religious beliefs merely as a motivation for their actions, 
while the latter describes historical events as the result of supernatural 
agency. Clearly then, the focus should remain on the particular treatment 
of causal-analytical systems—which, in general, differs between courses 
in the hard sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities—rather than 
the nominal label of a given course. For its purposes, this paper will 
define the social sciences as those disciplines that focus on human 
behaviors and that allow for the examination of causal-analytic beliefs as 
a means for understanding the behavior of those who possess those 
beliefs. The social sciences thus include disciplines such as economics, 
sociology, psychology, and history. The hard sciences are defined as 
those courses that apply a coherent causal-analytical system to predict, 
explain or model natural phenomena in a manner that is independent of 
human action. Examples of the hard sciences would be mathematics, the 
physical sciences, and the life sciences. The humanities functions as a 
catch-all group, subsuming fields such as literature, music, philosophy, 
and the arts; in each of these fields, the manner in which causal-analytic 
systems are treated is ambiguous. With these principles in mind, we 
proceed to evaluate the constitutionality of religious instruction in these 
three general domains of public school curricula. 
 
2.  Religion, as intelligent design, in the hard sciences 
 
The relationship between religion and science is commonly 
conceived in one of two ways: (1) religion and science are entirely 
separate spheres of inquiry, applicable under different circumstances and 
(2) religion and science are at odds, competing to explain natural 
phenomena with entirely contradictory theories. Depending on one’s 
view of the proper relations between naturalism and scientific reasoning, 
either one of these conceptions may be correct.164 Regardless of the 
philosophical position one takes on the role of naturalism in science, 
however, there exist two critical similarities between the religious and 
scientific realms. First, religion and science both involve claims about 
processes of cause-and-effect in the natural universe. The main 
distinction between the two in this regard is the nature of the causal 
factors each invokes: while science is bound by the strictures of 
methodological naturalism, religion allows for, and almost always 
includes, the interference of one or more supernatural agents in the 
natural order. Second, people (especially children) learn about religious 
 164. Those who believe that science requires ontological naturalism will see religion as a 
direct metaphysical competitor, while those who limit scientific claims to the strictures of 
methodological naturalism will likely acknowledge that religious and scientific views may coexist. 
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and scientific entities, and judge their truth-value, in a very similar 
manner.165 Because scientific and religious hypotheses are, in fact, highly 
related from a structural and pedagogical standpoint, a science course 
could easily be transformed into a vehicle for religious education by 
simply opening the door to supernatural agency.166 In this sense, courses 
in science dwell in precarious constitutional territory: one seemingly 
minor curricular alteration could transform a standard biology or physics 
class into a constitutionally-prohibited program of religious 
indoctrination. For various reasons, the Establishment Clause tests 
recognize this danger and prohibit the inclusion of religious propositions 
in science courses. Each of these tests is applied below to a specific 
religious proposition, the Intelligent Design hypothesis. 
We first consider the application of the Lemon test. As an initial 
matter, there is no reason to believe that instruction on the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis would necessarily foster entanglement with religious 
groups. Certainly, the ideas proposed by Intelligent Design theorists 
could be incorporated into standard biology textbooks without the need 
for significant administrative interaction with their religious sponsors. 
Thus, the entanglement prong of the Lemon test poses no barrier to 
religious instruction in public school science courses. 
Intelligent Design advocates have argued that inclusion of the 
hypothesis in public school science curricula furthers the critical secular 
purpose of exposing students to potent criticism of standard scientific 
dogma, thus satisfying Lemon’s second prong.167 While it is true that 
exposure to the process of scientific peer review is a valid secular 
purpose of scientific education, it is also true that scientific critiques of 
Darwinian evolution can be presented without the religious trappings that 
accompany the Intelligent Design hypothesis. The supposed flaws of 
evolutionary theory are quite separate from a proposed supernatural 
resolution.168 Thus, while the state may have a valid secular purpose in 
exposing students to the type of scientific criticism of Darwinist 
 165. See Paul L. Harris & Melissa A. Koenig, Trust in Testimony: How Children Learn About 
Science and Religion, 77 CHILD DEV. 505 (2006). See also Paul L. Harris, et al., Germs and Angels: 
The Role of Testimony in Young Children’s Ontology, 9 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 76 (2006). 
 166. Obviously, “religion” often involves more than mere claims of supernatural intervention 
in the natural order. For one, religions often preach guidelines for action in the natural world in the 
form of moral rules. Thus, introducing students to the notion of supernatural agency is not 
tantamount to comprehensively teaching a given religion. However, supernatural agency is a 
uniquely religious concept and, therefore, to teach the interference of supernatural agents in the 
natural order is to teach a religious idea. 
 167. See, e.g., Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 762 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 168. In fact, much of the criticism leveled by Intelligent Design theorists has already been 
resolved by naturalistic modifications to the Theory of Evolution, rendering supernatural 
explanations unnecessary. 
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evolution that forms the basis of the Intelligent Design hypothesis, there 
is no secular justification for presenting the hypothesis’ inference of 
supernatural agency. The Intelligent Design hypothesis thus fails the 
second prong of the Lemon test. 
Additionally, the primary effect of teaching the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis in a public school science course is to advance religion. As 
mentioned above, the major difference between the Theory of Evolution 
and the Intelligent Design hypothesis is the latter’s inference of 
supernatural agency, a religious notion. Because the Theory of Evolution 
is already taught in schools and because it is possible to present technical 
criticism of the Theory of Evolution without introducing an inference of 
supernatural agency, inclusion of the Intelligent Design hypothesis adds 
only one thing to the science curriculum: a religious belief. The 
Intelligent Design hypothesis therefore fails the primary effect prong of 
the Lemon test. 
Under the endorsement test, the key inquiry is whether a reasonable, 
objective observer would interpret the inclusion of the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis in a public school science curriculum as a state endorsement 
of religion.169 But what is the identity of the reasonable, objective 
observer of such a curricular maneuver? At the very least, students who 
are exposed to the Intelligent Design hypothesis as part of their 
coursework are direct observers of the school board’s policy.170 
However, it may also be that members of the community at large are 
aware of the policy, and thus constitute part of the listening audience.171 
If a reasonable, objective observer belonging to either group perceives 
government endorsement of a religious view, then the policy fails Justice 
O’Connor’s test. 
In evaluating whether a reasonable, objective student would infer 
state endorsement from a science curriculum that included the Intelligent 
Design hypothesis, the key is context. As was discussed in Section 
III.B.1, students tend to lend higher credence to information they are 
taught in hard science courses than they do in other courses. The material 
learned in the context of a science class is viewed as “factual” and 
“certain.”172 Also, students tend to view their science teachers as 
authorities from whom this factual, certain information is to be 
 169. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 869 (2005). 
 170. In this sense, schoolchildren are analogous to “the members of the listening audience” 
mentioned in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe. 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000). 
 171. In Kitzmiller, Judge Jones noted that the Dover School Board’s distribution of a 
newsletter explaining their policy and public defense of their actions brought the community at large 
into the policy’s audience. 400 F. Supp. 2d at 715–16. 
 172. Hofer & Pintrich, supra note 155, at 126. 
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learned.173 A reasonable, objective student would, by virtue of these 
epistemological assumptions, presume that the state—in the form of the 
school district and the science instructors in its employ—endorses the 
accuracy of material included in the scientific curriculum. Thus, were a 
district to present the Intelligent Design hypothesis in science classes 
without a complementary presentation on the Theory of Evolution, a 
reasonable, objective student would almost certainly infer state 
endorsement of the hypothesis. However, because the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis is likely to be presented alongside its rival, the Theory of 
Evolution, it is less clear that the students would infer state endorsement 
of either causal-analytic system. The mere fact that competing theories 
are presented in tandem—implying that neither theory is 
incontrovertible174—might counteract any message of endorsement 
inherent to the context of science. 
Even if a reasonable, objective student would infer state endorsement 
of the Intelligent Design hypothesis by virtue of its inclusion in the 
science curriculum, it is questionable, for two reasons, whether such a 
student would view the Intelligent Design hypothesis as a religious 
notion. First, it is unclear whether the endorsement test is to be applied 
through the eyes of religious adherents or non-adherents.175 This 
ambiguity could play an important role in applying the endorsement test 
to the Intelligent Design hypothesis. Religious students are far less likely 
to equate the Intelligent Design hypothesis, with all of its technical 
sophistication and abstract claims, with religious faith. To the faithful, 
Intelligent Design would seem a rather Spartan faith, lacking many 
features common to modern theologically-sophisticated religion (such as 
community, ritual, revelation, etc.). However, non-religious students—
especially the atheists among them—are more likely to perceive the 
supernatural claims of the Intelligent Design hypothesis as religious in 
nature. Thus, whether the reasonable, objective observer infers state 
endorsement of the Intelligent Design hypothesis will likely depend on 
the religious persuasion of the observer. Second, it is questionable 
whether even the most reasonable and objective of elementary, middle, 
 173. Id. 
 174. From a scientific standpoint, this is certainly a fallacious message. However, the First 
Amendment does not necessarily require that schools accurately relay the scientific community’s 
opinion to students. 
 175. Professor Tribe argues that, although Justice O’Connor implies, in Lynch, that the proper 
frame of reference is that of a non-adherent, her “analysis seemed to proceed from the perspective of 
an adherent.” TRIBE, supra note 116, at 1292–93. Tribe further asserts that “in deciding whether a 
government practice would impermissibly convey a message of endorsement, one should adopt the 
perspective of a non-adherent; actions that reasonably offend non-adherents may seem so natural and 
proper to adherents as to blur into the background noise of society.” Id. 
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or high school students is capable of appreciating the anthropological and 
legal rationale for defining religious beliefs as those founded on abstract 
notions of supernatural agency. In any case, if the reasonable, objective 
student is attributed this intellectual sophistication, then it is far less clear 
that such a student would naively infer state endorsement of an idea 
merely because it is presented within the context of a science class. 
In sum, it is unclear whether a reasonable, objective student would 
infer state endorsement of the Intelligent Design hypothesis and 
simultaneously deem such a belief religious. Although students are 
highly likely to infer state endorsement of material presented in the 
context of a science course, it is possible that the hypothesis could be 
presented in such a way that minimizes or even eliminates entirely this 
message of endorsement. Also, it is questionable whether the student 
audience will detect a religious message in a presentation of the 
Intelligent Design hypothesis.176 A similar analysis applies to reasonable, 
objective adult members of the community who, while more likely to 
perceive the Intelligent Design hypothesis as a religious notion, would be 
less likely to perceive state endorsement of the hypothesis. 
Lastly, we consider the coercion test. As was discussed above, both 
religious and scientific systems seek to explain the causes of natural 
phenomena. It is fundamentally a scientific exercise to propose a causal 
process that conforms to the rigors of methodological naturalism. 
Similarly, it is fundamentally a religious exercise to attribute causation to 
a supernatural agent, especially in the context of creation. Instruction on 
the Intelligent Design hypothesis in a science course would result in 
obvious coercion if students are required to derive, apply, or argue for 
the hypothesis on their class work. This is especially true if grades are 
determined on the basis of whether students obtained the “correct” 
answer consistent with the Intelligent Design causal-analytic system, 
which would necessarily involve the attribution of causation to a 
supernatural agent. But, even if students are not required to apply the 
Intelligent Design hypothesis on written class work, any presentation of 
the hypothesis would require students to sit quietly while observing the 
teacher engage in the religious exercise of inferring a supernatural 
creator from evidence found in the natural universe. Such a scenario is 
equivalent to the plight of the graduating students in Lee v. Weisman,177 
 176. This observation results from the limits placed on the analysis of this paper, which 
excludes the religious pedigree of Intelligent Design hypothesis and the affiliations of its proponents 
from consideration in the interest of evaluating a particular hypothetical situation. If this information 
is made available to objective, reasonable observers, it is far more likely that they would detect a 
religious message. In fact, the Kitzmiller opinion found a violation of the endorsement test primarily 
on these grounds. See 400 F. Supp. 2d at 708. 
 177. In fact, the policy in this hypothetical case would be even more coercive than the prayer 
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and would thus violate the Establishment Clause’s “minimum guarantee” 
against coercion. 
In summary, instruction on the Intelligent Design hypothesis in 
public school science courses fails at least two of the three tests that 
appear in the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence and 
therefore may not be presented without violating the First Amendment. 
The hypothesis’ failure of these tests, however, is quite dependent on the 
specific epistemological perception of scientific knowledge and 
pedagogical structure of science courses. When viewed under the Lemon 
and coercion tests, the hypothesis fails because of the parallel structure of 
scientific and religious hypotheses; because science and religion, as 
causal-analytic systems, both seek causes to natural phenomena, the 
addition of supernatural agency to the scientific curriculum leads to 
instruction in a religious hypothesis. Given the particular assumptions of 
this paper, analysis of the Intelligent Design hypothesis under the 
endorsement test yields no clear result. Although the high 
epistemological truth-value students assign information gained in science 
courses and the heightened deference students are likely to give science 
instructors lead to a high probability that students would infer state 
endorsement of the hypothesis when presented in a science course, such 
inferences would likely be attenuated by complementary instruction on 
the Theory of Evolution. Because these considerations are unique to the 
hard sciences, however, a similar analysis performed on courses in the 
social sciences is likely to yield different constitutional conclusions. 
 
3.  Religion in the social sciences 
 
While the Supreme Court has consistently found religion-infused 
public school science curricula to be in violation of the Establishment 
Clause, the Court has implied on at least two occasions that religious 
topics could be taught in the context of history courses without offending 
the First Amendment.178 The reason for this intuitive distinction between 
the physical and social sciences’ respective treatments of religion 
becomes apparent when religious instruction in the context of a social 
in Lee v. Weisman, as attendance in science classes is far less voluntary than is attendance at a 
graduation ceremony. See 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 178. See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (stating that “[i]t certainly 
may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have 
said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a 
secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.”). See 
also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (noting that “study of religions and of the Bible 
from a literary and historic viewpoint, presented objectively as part of a secular program of 
education, need not collide with the First Amendment’s prohibition . . . .”). 
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science course is analyzed under the three Establishment Clause tests. 
The following analysis assumes that instruction in the social sciences 
adheres to the definition of the social sciences described in Section 
IV.B.1—namely, courses in the social sciences are those that focus on 
the behavior of human beings and in which the discussion of religious 
causal-analytic systems may be limited to the role such systems play in 
motivating individuals or groups. 
Instruction on religious concepts in a social sciences course is first 
analyzed under the rubric of the Lemon test. As an initial matter, the 
entanglement prong presents no problem. The state is perfectly capable 
of accessing and including within their educational materials information 
about various religious groups without the aid or intrusion of the groups 
themselves. Secondly, there is a clear secular purpose to educating 
students of the social sciences on the important influence religious 
doctrine and organizations have wielded—and continue to wield—on 
human society. As Justice Clark noted in Schempp, “[i]t might well be 
said that one’s education is not complete without a study of . . . the 
history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of 
civilization.”179
The most pertinent question under the Lemon test, then, is whether 
the discussion of religious doctrine in the context of a social sciences 
course would have a principle or primary effect that either advances or 
inhibits religion. Obviously, religious doctrine could be presented in such 
a way in a social sciences course that either advantages or inhibits 
religion. However, neither effect inevitably flows from the study of 
religious material in the context of the social sciences. While religious 
notions taught as causal-analytic systems in the hard sciences—due to 
the structural similarities between scientific and religious systems and 
the students’ general epistemological perception that scientific claims are 
truthful—inherently advance religion, the social sciences allow room for 
objective, even-handed evaluation of religious notions and their effects 
on human behavior as well as an acknowledgment that such beliefs are 
subjective and not necessarily indicative of metaphysical truths. This is 
true because the social sciences often employ human beliefs as merely 
one causal factor affecting human behavior. Students in a history course, 
for example, might learn that Christian beliefs served as justification for 
the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition as well as an impetus driving the 
American abolitionist movement. Such an objective presentation would 
eliminate any advantages or disadvantages to the religion under scrutiny. 
A presentation of religion that conforms to the Supreme Court’s 
 179. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225. 
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condition, “presented objectively as part of a secular program of 
education,” will pass this key prong of the Lemon test; treatments of 
religion that stray from objectivity, towards either an unduly negative or 
positive bent, would fail to meet the requirements of the Establishment 
Clause. In any case, the key observation is that the social sciences, in 
contrast to the hard sciences, allow for objective, secular treatment of 
religious beliefs. Therefore, the presentation of religious ideas in the 
context of a social sciences course would not necessarily have a principle 
or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. 
We next consider Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test. The analysis 
under this test is similar to that performed under the Lemon test. As 
mentioned above, the mere inclusion of religious material in the social 
sciences curriculum need not create any entanglement problems. The 
remaining question, then, is whether instruction about religion within a 
course on the social sciences would necessarily be read as state 
endorsement of religious ideas. There are several reasons to believe that 
a reasonable, objective observer, in the form of either a typical student or 
member of the community, would not presume state endorsement of 
religious notions merely by virtue of their inclusion in the social sciences 
curriculum. First of all, observers may very well infer state endorsement 
of the truth of the material presented to them in the context of the social 
sciences. However, the claims of truth regarding religious material as 
presented in the social sciences, by definition, need not be equivalent to 
claims of the truth of religious doctrine or accuracy of the religious 
causal-analytic system; rather, the relevant truth-claim in the social 
sciences may be that certain beliefs are (or were) held by certain people, 
and that these beliefs in some way influenced their behavior. It is state 
endorsement of this “upper tier” claim about the causal effects of 
subjective religious beliefs on the believers, and not the truth of the 
religious claims themselves, that, in the context of the social sciences, a 
reasonable, objective observer would likely perceive. Second, research 
shows that students typically view material taught in the social sciences, 
as opposed to the hard sciences, as less dependent on authority for 
validation. Students are therefore less likely to seek authority for—and 
thus less likely to perceive state endorsement of—claims presented in the 
context of the social sciences than they are for claims presented in a 
course on the hard sciences. For these reasons, the inclusion of religious 
material in the social sciences curricula need not violate the endorsement 
test. 
Finally, we come to the coercion test of Lee v. Weisman. It was 
argued above that instruction on religious notions in the context of the 
hard sciences violated the Establishment Clause’s prohibition of 
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coercion. This conclusion was based on the rationale that, because of the 
structural similarity in scientific and religious systems, the infusion of 
supernatural agency into an otherwise scientific causal-analytic system 
resulted in a religious system. Social science courses, on the other hand, 
need not require students to participate in or observe religious exercises. 
Religion, in the context of the social sciences, may be presented as a 
historical fact and as a force motivating human behavior. Students of 
history or sociology need not engage in the religious practice of 
attributing causation for observed phenomena to the intervention of a 
supernatural agent; rather, students need only understand how belief in a 
supernatural agent might have affected the human subject of their study. 
It was argued in Section III.A.4 that the former exercise is fundamentally 
religious in nature. However, there is no reason to believe that the latter 
process is uniquely religious. Thus, the social sciences allow for 
treatment of religious material in a manner that does not coerce religious 
exercise. Nor is it necessary for the purposes of the social sciences to 
expose students to religious exercise in a manner analogous to the 
controversial prayer in Lee v. Weisman. Social science teachers, in the 
process of introducing the religious beliefs of the individual or group 
under study, need not perform the religious act of inferring supernatural 
agency from empirical data or claiming that supernatural agency is a 
valid means for understanding natural phenomena; rather, they may 
simply present the relevant ideas as the beliefs of a group external to the 
students who comprise the class. The presentation of religious ideas 
within the context of a social science course can therefore be 
accomplished without transgressing the Establishment Clause’s 
“minimum guarantee.” 
In summary, there is no reason to believe that religion could not be 
presented in social science courses without violating the Establishment 
Clause. Of course, it is certainly possible to infuse a social science course 
with an unconstitutional treatment of religion. For example, a history 
instructor could, when describing the influence of Christianity on the 
emancipation movement, improperly insist that the North’s victory in the 
American Civil War was due to God’s direct intervention on behalf of 
Southern slaves.180 However, in contrast to the hard sciences, there is no 
inherent quality of the social sciences which renders instruction on 
religious material within their context a fundamentally religious practice. 
While religion-infused social science curricula must therefore be 
evaluated on a case-by-case basis, it is clear that the public school 
 180. That such a claim would be constitutionally improper does not imply that a 
complementary moral claim—that the North’s temperament towards slavery was morally superior—
would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. 
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curriculum is not entirely off-limits to religious material. It is feasible 
that the Intelligent Design hypothesis could be presented in a social 
science course—perhaps a history course that examines major cultural 
phenomena in twenty-first century America—without violating the First 
Amendment. 
 
4.  Religion in the humanities 
 
In addition to the social sciences, Justices Clark and Fortas have 
suggested that instruction on religious notions might be permissible in 
the context of humanities classes (specifically, literature and comparative 
religion).181 An evaluation of religious beliefs as taught within the 
context of the humanities involves considerations quite distinct from 
those surrounding religious instruction within the sciences. On the one 
hand, students view knowledge gained in the humanities as even less 
authoritative than that presented in the context of the social sciences.182 
Thus, students are unlikely to infer state endorsement of religious beliefs 
presented within the context of the humanities and, therefore, the 
presentation of religious ideas in humanities courses would be expected 
to pass Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test. On the other hand, the 
treatment of causal-analytic systems in the humanities is more 
ambiguous than in the sciences. The humanities, unlike the social 
sciences, do not necessarily treat causal-analytic belief systems as merely 
a relevant characteristic of the human subjects of study. It was the 
peculiar treatment of causal-analytic systems in the social sciences that 
was shown to render the study of religious ideas within their context 
permissible under the Lemon and coercion tests. The key question, then, 
is whether religious ideas may be presented in humanities courses in a 
way that neither has a primary effect of advancing religion nor 
improperly coerces respect for religious exercise. On both of these 
counts, the specific nature of the academic discipline is likely to be 
determinative. We briefly explore the application of the Lemon and 
coercion tests to the presentation of religious beliefs in courses on 
comparative religion, literature, and philosophy. 
In Schempp, Justice Clark implied that instruction on religious topics 
might be permissible in the context of the comparative study of 
religions.183 While comparative religion is certainly a study of the beliefs 
 181. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225. 
 182. See Michael B. Paulsen & Charles T. Wells, Domain Differences in the Epistemological 
Beliefs of College Students, 39 RES. IN HIGHER EDU. 365, 372–75 (1998). 
 183. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225 (stating that “In addition, it might well be said that one’s 
education is not complete without a study of comparative religion. . . . Nothing we have said here 
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and behavior of human beings, and is therefore similar to social sciences, 
the comparative study of religion does not necessarily explore belief 
systems in the interest of understanding the motivations for non-religious 
human action. Rather, comparative religion courses focus more closely 
on religious belief systems for their own sake. What, then, explains 
Justice Clark’s intuition that religious material might be presented as part 
of a comparative religion course without offending the First 
Amendment? There are two possible responses. First, it could be that the 
nature of comparative religion courses is such that the causal-analytic 
systems under study are attributed to groups external to and distinct from 
the group of students. In this sense, comparative religion courses are 
similar to courses in the social sciences in which students study groups 
with whom they are not expected to identify, and are quite different from 
courses in the hard sciences in which students are clearly expected to act 
like scientists.184 Such an externalization of the causal-analytic beliefs 
might prove sufficient to eliminate the threat of coercion. Second, 
comparative religion courses come with a ready-made anti-establishment 
feature: namely, they provide such a wide survey and critical analysis of 
religions (and, perhaps, non-religions or anti-religions) that they convey 
no advantage or disadvantage to, and imply no state endorsement of, 
particular religions or religion in general. A balanced, objective survey of 
human religious beliefs might, by its very nature, simply avoid these 
Establishment Clause pitfalls. 
Literature is yet another domain in which religious material might be 
presented in public schools. Both Justices Clark and Fortas have 
suggested that religious texts, including the Christian Bible, might 
permissibly be studied in public schools for its literary qualities.185 
Whether such a presentation complies with the Establishment Clause 
likely depends on the particular manner in which literature is evaluated 
in a given course. Donald lists thirteen distinct methods of literary 
criticism that might be applied to evaluate a text, including (among 
others) moral and philosophical criticism, historical criticism, rhetorical 
criticism, formalism, and structuralism.186 An evaluation of a religious 
text under the rubric of moral and philosophical criticism, which focuses 
on the truth and usefulness of a work’s substantive ideas, would almost 
certainly violate the Establishment Clause. However, an analysis of a 
indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular 
program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.”). 
 184. Duschl & Hamilton, supra note 159, at 5 (implying that a goal of scientific education 
should be to encourage students to “‘do science,’ and not simply learn ‘about science’”). 
 185. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225. 
 186. DONALD, supra note 159, at 248–49. 
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religious text by means of historical and rhetorical criticism, which 
emphasizes the relation of the text to historical events, or under the 
lenses of formalism and structuralism, which evaluates the grammatical, 
syntactic and structural merits of a text, could potentially satisfy the 
Lemon and coercion tests. The relevant distinction is in the way the 
various methods of criticism treat the substantive ideas, including any 
causal-analytic claims, presented within a literary work. Where moral 
and philosophical criticism is primarily concerned with the merits of a 
text’s substantive claims, the other methods remain indifferent to the 
truth of a given work’s substantive ideas. Literary analysis of a religious 
text that maintains indifference towards the text’s substantive claims 
would likely pass both the coercion and Lemon tests. Such a presentation 
would not coerce students to practice religion because the literary and 
historical analysis of a religious text is not necessarily a religious 
endeavor. And, the secular purposes of such study—including instructing 
students on the historical relevance of religious texts as well as their 
influence on literature—overwhelm any benefit or detriment that would 
accrue to religion. However, the presentation of a religious text in public 
schools under any circumstances carries a high risk of abuse. The 
balance between secular purposes and undue benefit to religion is, in this 
case, a precarious one. If the Bible or another religious text is to be 
presented in public schools, it must be treated as merely a work of 
literature, written by mortal men. Any implication that the work 
possesses special significance (aside from its influence on history, 
literature, art, etc.) would convey an undue advantage to religion, 
resulting in an Establishment Clause violation. 
Finally, we consider the discipline of philosophy. Unlike history, 
comparative religion, and literature, the Supreme Court has never 
specifically implied that religious notions could be presented in the 
context of a philosophy course. However, philosophy is a domain in 
which religious ideas would be expected to arise in an ambiguous 
epistemological and metaphysical context and, therefore, presents an 
interesting case for application of the principles elaborated in this paper. 
For example, a comprehensive study of western philosophy would 
almost certainly include the works of pluralists, such as René Descartes, 
who propose the existence of substances external to the natural realm. 
Typically, these supernatural substances take the form of supernatural 
agents such as God or the soul. Under the supernatural agency definition, 
pluralist philosophy would be identified as religious, despite its abstract 
and sophisticated nature.187 Also, it could be that the Intelligent Design 
 187. In this sense, the pluralist philosophy is highly analogous to the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis. 
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hypothesis finds an academic home in philosophy. Should these ideas be 
excluded from a public school education in philosophy? The answer is 
unclear from the perspectives of both epistemological perception and 
pedagogical structure. More research is needed to determine how 
students perceive knowledge gained in the context of philosophy courses, 
but at least one study has shown that scholars (but not necessarily 
students) view philosophy, when compared to a set of thirty-six 
academic subjects, as most similar to the study of history.188 Assuming 
their perception of a subject tracks that of university-level scholars, 
students might therefore view knowledge gained in the context of a 
philosophy course as epistemologically equivalent to that obtained in 
courses on the social sciences. This suggests that philosophy is an area in 
which the risk of inferred state endorsement is low. In addition to 
students’ epistemological perception of the material presented in a 
philosophy course, the manner in which causal-analytic systems are 
presented may allow for the inclusion of religious material in philosophy 
courses. The nature of the subject matter one would expect to be taught 
in a philosophy course allows for both hard science-type and social 
science-type treatment of causal-analytic systems. On the one hand, 
philosophy courses might present the notions of dualism and Intelligent 
Design as legitimate causal-analytic systems in the science-type sense 
(i.e., as a legitimate system with which to understand observed 
phenomena). On the other hand, it may be that philosophy classes (at 
least, on the level at which they are most likely to be taught in pre-
college education) function more like social science courses, merely 
enumerating and exploring a history of philosophical thought rather than 
presenting particular philosophical ideas as useful or “true” causal-
analytic systems. The constitutionality of teaching pluralism would 
therefore depend on the manner in which the topic is presented in a 
philosophy course. 
 
V.  DOES TEACHING THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION VIOLATE THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE? 
 
While it is clear that teaching the Intelligent Design hypothesis in 
science courses violates the Establishment Clause, it has been suggested 
that public school instruction on the Theory of Evolution also violates 
the Establishment Clause. Two distinct arguments have been proposed in 
 188. Anthony Biglan, The Characteristics of Subject Matter in Different Academic Areas, 57 
J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 195, 195–203 (1973). The similarity was judged along three dimensions: 
“(a) existence of a paradigm, (b) concern with application, and (c) concern with life systems.” Id. at 
195. 
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this regard. First, it has been asserted that the Theory of Evolution has 
attained the status of a religious belief,189 and thus public school 
instruction on neo-Darwinist principles represents a straight-forward 
violation of the Establishment Clause. However, the Darwinism-as-
religion argument relies on a rather abstract, liberal definition of religion 
that is not generally accepted by the anthropological community. Such an 
understanding is certainly inconsistent with legal definitions of religion, 
which view non-theistic religion as a rare exception to the general 
equation of religion and theism.190 While two Supreme Court opinions 
have implied the possibility that certain non-theistic systems might 
qualify as religions,191 the Theory of Evolution almost certainly amounts 
to an “essentially . . . philosophical view” and, therefore, is not entitled to 
legal status as a non-theistic religious belief.192
Another argument proposes that because the Theory of Evolution 
directly contradicts religious claims, it is a violation of constitutionally-
mandated neutrality towards religion to instruct students on Darwinism 
without including complementary material on the religious beliefs that 
the theory contradicts.193 If the Establishment Clause prohibits teaching 
these religious views, say the proponents of this theory, then Darwinism 
must be excluded as well.194 In a general sense, the premise of this claim 
is incorrect: the Theory of Evolution need not contradict the general 
religious claim that supernatural agents cause certain natural phenomena. 
The principle of methodological naturalism that underlies science does 
not equate to the strong metaphysical claim that natural causes are the 
only causes that exist;195 rather, methodological naturalism represents the 
weaker claim that science should merely limit its search for causal 
mechanisms to those found within the natural world. Under this view, a 
scientist would admit that supernatural causes may, in fact, exist, but 
insist that speculation about such causes is simply not the province of 
science. In other words, because the principle of methodological 
naturalism falls short of the claim that science is the ultimate and 
exclusive source for metaphysical truth, an understanding of science 
based on methodological naturalism allows room for the Theory of 
 189. See generally MARY MIDGLEY, EVOLUTION AS A RELIGION (revised ed. 2002). 
 190. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 191. See discussion supra Part III.A.2. 
 192. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165 (1965). 
 193. See, e.g., Timothy A. Crater et al., Suggested Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
Concerning Kansas Science Education Standards 56–57 (2005), http://www.kansasscience2005.com 
/Findings%20of%20fact%20final.pdf (arguing that Kansas state science standards which defined 
science as a naturalistic enterprise violate government neutrality towards religion). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Such a claim is the essence of ontological—as opposed to methodological—naturalism. 
  
226 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 22 
 
Evolution to coexist with religious causal-analytic systems. 
That said, it is true that the historical claims of the Theory of 
Evolution are inconsistent with the doctrine of some specific faiths. 
Thus, it would seem that teaching evolution in the public schools violates 
Lemon’s prohibition of policies that either advance or inhibit religion. 
However, the Supreme Court has consistently applied a preference for 
the secular curriculum when it has come into conflict with religious 
doctrine. This preference is based on the observation that, although many 
secular areas of study contradict specific theological claims, such 
contradiction is not the primary effect of secular education. For instance, 
in Edwards v. Aguillard, the Court struck down a balanced-treatment 
statute that would have required Louisiana schools to teach creationism if 
the Theory of Evolution was presented.196 The balanced-treatment 
legislation was trumpeted by its proponents as a paragon of church-state 
neutrality.197 However, the Court disagreed, finding no secular purpose 
and striking down the legislation as a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.198 Edwards thus indicates that the Establishment Clause brooks 
no instruction on religious beliefs in science courses under the pretense 
of academic neutrality, but it does not answer whether instruction on 
scientific theories contradictory to religious doctrine runs afoul of the 
Establishment Clause. That answer was given in Epperson, in which the 
Court unequivocally stated that the First Amendment neither requires nor 
even allows the omission of scientific material from the public school 
science curriculum on the ground that the material conflicts with 
religious doctrine.199 If evolution cannot be removed from the classroom 
for religious reasons without affecting an unconstitutional establishment, 
then it can hardly be said that instruction on evolutionary theory amounts 
to an establishment of religion. Despite the fact that the Theory of 
Evolution contradicts the historical claims of many religious faiths, the 
Court has clearly implied that the theory’s inclusion in public school 
curricula does not amount to an unconstitutional establishment of 
religion. 
 
 
 
 196. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582 (1987). 
 197. Id. at 619–26. 
 198. Id. at 595–96. 
 199. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1968) (stating that the First Amendment 
“forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed 
antagonistic to a particular dogma”); see also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 
(1952) (insisting that “the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from 
views distasteful to them . . . .”). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has argued that while instruction on the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis in a public school science-type curriculum would violate the 
Establishment Clause, it is possible to present religious ideas in public 
schools without transgressing the First Amendment. In developing this 
argument, two important concepts were proposed. First, although 
comprehensively cataloguing the range of beliefs that qualify as religious 
under the First Amendment is likely an impossible task, a useful test that 
defines religious ideas as those that invoke supernatural agency to 
explain observed phenomena was proposed. Under this test, the 
Intelligent Design hypothesis was shown to qualify as a religious notion. 
Second, it was shown that the various academic domains differ 
significantly in their treatment of causal-analytic systems as well as their 
perceived epistemological character. The particular characteristics of the 
hard sciences make courses in these subjects ill-suited for 
constitutionally permissible instruction on religious ideas. However, as 
implied by Justices Fortas and Clark, the social sciences and humanities 
offer a more suitable pedagogical environment for the presentation of 
religious beliefs in a manner consistent with the strictures of the 
Establishment Clause. Thus, while the Intelligent Design theory may not 
be taught as a scientific theory, similarly religious ideas could be 
presented as part of the social sciences or humanities curriculum. 
It is important to note that the analysis in this paper proceeded 
irrespective of the intellectual pedigree of the Intelligent Design 
hypothesis as well as the motivations or religious affiliations of 
Intelligent Design advocates. Although the motivations of policymakers 
and the known history of an advocacy movement are clearly relevant to 
the evaluation of a given policy under the Establishment Clause, by 
ignoring these features of the Intelligent Design hypothesis, it is possible 
to craft an analysis of more general application. The Intelligent Design 
hypothesis is similar to many ideas, such as pluralist metaphysics, that 
are of undeniable academic interest. Understanding how the substance of 
the Intelligent Design hypothesis interacts with the Establishment Clause 
thus gives us a framework to evaluate the establishment consequences of 
public school instruction on analogous concepts that lack clear ties to 
religious organizations or advocacy groups. Under the framework 
established in this paper, the presentation of such concepts would likely 
be permissible in courses on the social sciences and humanities, but not 
in the hard sciences. While the former allows for secular, objective study 
of religious ideas, the latter presents the risk of state indoctrination—a 
risk the Establishment Clause will not tolerate. 
